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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to find how municipal crime levels changed in Finland in relation to the 
municipal alcohol availability during the years 1960-1975. The main focus is in the legislative change 
known as Keskiolutlaki (enforced in 1969), which liberated the retail sales of medium-strength beer 
across the land and ended the prohibition-like conditions that existed in the rural municipalities. 
The study of this subtle relationship between alcohol and crime is done with regression analysis. 
Furthermore, tools such as fixed effects, differences-in-differences and Poisson regression are used 
in distinguishing this relationship. Before the regressions, I review the legislative change in a 
historical perspective, its implications to alcohol consumption and previous studies on how alcohol 
availability affects consequent crime rates. 
The main dependent variables of this study are overall crime, traffic crime, other crime, drunk 
arrests (which means drunk and disorderly conduct), batteries and ‘fatal offences and attempts at 
these’. The main independent variables reflect the municipal-level alcohol supply in the consequent 
years. The crime levels are population adjusted (or exposed to the population in Poisson 
regressions). In order to further distinguish between how alcohol supply affected different 
municipalities’ crime levels after the legislative change, a quasi-experimental, differences-in-
differences -based research setup is used. The treatment and control groups are formed according 
to the placement of Alko stores, which the most distinct form of alcohol supply in Finland 
The spatial availability of alcohol supply can be seen to significantly influence arrests regarding 
more precise study: More time-invariant variables especially regarding socioeconomic and- 
demographic municipal differences and more accurate estimates on how the alcohol supply and the 
municipal populations were geographically distributed could lead to more accurate results. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Before 1969 buying liquor was hard on the Finnish countryside as the sales were limited to 
cities and municipalities with almost city like rights (kauppala in Finnish). Things changed 
with the introduction of Keskiolutlaki (462/1968, translated to Act on Medium-Strength 
Beer). It partially substituted the Laki väkijuomista (45/1932, translated to Act on Hard 
Liquor), which had been active since Kieltolaki (158/1922, the Finnish Prohibition) was 
brought to an end in 1932. As one can predict by its name, the new law’s center point was 
expanding and legalizing the sales of medium-strength beer in retail stores and beer-serving 
licensed premises nationwide, but in addition the age limits for purchasing alcohol were toned 
down and licensed premises1 and state monopoly liquor stores could be established in the 
countryside. 
Out of the three main reforms stated earlier, two are quite similar when considering the 
geographical impact they had in consumption: The lowered age limits and the medium-
strength beer’s march across the land with retail stores and beer joints as its acting envoys. 
Location-wise, the medium-strength beer sales network can be seen as a reasonably efficient 
market. The age limits did not spatially discriminate either, because they are nationally 
universal.  
The third reform, concerning the former rural-urban divide on the alcohol supply, on the other 
hand is geographically quite asymmetric (yet there is endogeneity related): The Finnish 
alcohol monopoly’s, Alko Inc.’s spreading in the countryside can be seen as an asymmetric 
alcohol supply shock in terms with the Alko stores’ more limited geographic coverage. Alko 
Inc. controls the retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages exceeding 4.7 % alcohol by volume 
(ABV) to this day. The monopoly did not and still does not distribute in the most efficient 
possible manner, with its guidelines somewhere in between being a responsible distributor 
and a profit maker. Considering the fact that more than half of the Finnish population was 
                                                 
1 Note that there is a distinction between licensed premises that serve more potent alcohol (restaurants and bars) 
and premises that were established onwards from 1969 and could only serve medium-strength beer.   
  
 
 2 
living in the rural municipalities in 1968, the new legislative changes made alcohol more 
available to roughly 2.4 million persons2. The rural limitations for the licensed premises were 
also shifted with the new legislation, which makes them an interesting part of this reform as 
well.   
Altogether these changes had an imminent effect on the annual Finnish alcohol consumption, 
which rose 46 % converted into absolute alcohol in just one year (Oy Alko ab, 1970).  While 
it is clear that the changes brought by the new law altered the Finnish consumption statistics, 
it is also interesting to see what kind of social implications the then-new legislation had.  
The aim of this study is to determine whether the legislative changes in different elements of 
Finnish alcohol supply affected municipal-level crime in Finland. In order to study this 
relation there are two main observed variables: The municipal distance to the closest 
municipality with an Alko store and a dummy variable expressing licensed premises in the 
municipal area. Simultaneously the other elements of the legislative change are attempted to 
control with a dummy variable. 
The justification for the main explanatory variables goes as follows: The Alko stores and the 
licensed premises can be seen as asymmetrical supply shocks, while the other changes 
introduced by Keskiolutlaki can be seen as a rather symmetrical supply shock. With this in 
mind, I am going to estimate on how the changes in distances to the nearest Alko stores and in 
the existence of municipal licensed premises correlated in the municipal crime statistics.  
This framework, more historical background and the statistical approach will be discussed 
more thoroughly in their respective chapters.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Population statistics 1968: Rural population 2404400 (51%) vs. city population 2294000 (49%) (Central 
Statistical Office, 1970). 
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1.2 The importance of the subject  
As the legislative change is the biggest alcohol reform since the Finnish prohibition was 
ended in 1932, it serves as a huge social experiment of how toned down alcohol control 
affects alcohol use and alcohol-induced problems in the society.  
Of course the people living in the countryside were able to get a hold of alcohol from the 
cities before the legislative change, or even distil it in the wilderness behind some spruce, but 
it got a whole less laborious in 1969. One interesting aspect is that, as peculiar as it may 
sound, in some regions the rather controlled alcohol outlets might even reduce crime opposed 
to uncontrolled use of alcohol.  
At first one might think that the relative effect of the new Alko stores or the role of the 
licensed premises on the alcohol induced crimes might be rather marginal or even 
nonexistent, diminished by the overall legislative changes. However, “Alcohol Availability, 
Prenatal Conditions, and Long-term Economic Outcomes”, a study by J Peter Nilsson (2014), 
acts as inspiration in terms of the scale of effects. Nilsson has studied the effects of a rather 
brief prenatal exposure to loosened alcohol supply in terms of strong beer in retail stores. The 
experiment took part in two regions of Sweden for a time window of 8.5 months and 
according to it, the prenatal children that were influenced by this sales experiment have lower 
earnings, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities and generally have it worse than their 
surrounding (non-prenatal while the experiment took place) cohorts. Thus even relatively 
small sounding changes in availability of alcohol can make a significant difference in the 
outcomes, and considering that Keskiolutlaki leveled out huge regional differences in alcohol 
supply makes this a fruitful setting research-wise.  
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1.3 The approach and unfortunate limitations  
In order to estimate whether the proximity of Alko stores and the licensed premises had an 
effect on (the alcohol related) crime, regression analyses are performed. The crime statistics 
chosen for this study are overall crime, ‘murders, manslaughters & attempts at both of these’, 
batteries, traffic crimes, other crimes and drunk arrests (which expresses drunk and disorderly 
conduct), which, on a side note, is not a crime itself, just a reason for an arrest. For crimes that 
involve violence (‘murders, manslaughters and attempts at both of these’ and batteries), 
Poisson regression is chosen as the primary tool, as violence in a municipal scale is after all a 
relatively rare event and this approach can estimate the differences influenced by the 
legislative change on these relatively low statistics. 
In addition to the statistics that involve municipal criminal activity or alcohol availability, 
factors such as municipal population density, different dummy variables regarding legislative 
changes and a time trend variable are used in the regressions. The fixed effects regressions 
attempt to control the unobserved municipal differences that are time-consistent.  
The statistics are comprised of criminality known to the police statistics from 1960-1975 
(Central Statistical Office, 1960-1971) (Central Statistical Office of Finland, 1972-1975), the 
year books of Alko Inc. for the respective years (Oy Alkoholiliike ab, 1960-1969) (Oy Alko 
ab, 1970-1975) and the municipal areas and distances are calculated from municipal division 
maps from the years 1960 and 2015 (Maanmittaushallitus, 1960) (National Land Survey, Esri 
Finland , 2015). The acquisition of these statistics is thoroughly explained in chapter 5.  
Naturally there are also limitations for this study. Below I have listed some issues of 
importance:  
It must be noted that while the proximities of alcohol serving outlets do not tell anything 
about individual consumption of alcohol, rather the variables associated with the supply can 
be used as a proxy for the opportunity to consume alcohol (or as changes in proximities as 
changes in opportunities to consume alcohol). Statistics-wise these consumption opportunities 
are controlled for the alcohol over 4.7 % ABV, which was limited to the licensed premises 
and Alko stores before and after the legislative change. However for the medium-strength 
beer serving outlet statistics are not included due to the fact that I could not find them on a 
consistent statistical form. Instead of being announced on a municipal level, they were largely 
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announced on a sales territorial level, which did not function that well with the other statistics. 
However there is a workaround for this in the form of a dummy variable as the medium-
strength beer sales network’s launch can be seen as rather all-compassing nation-wide.  
As for the limitations regarding the crime statistics, they are largely announced on an 
aggregated level due to the fact that they had to be manually compiled and because they were 
initially announced on a rather general level. This leads to a fact that certain notable crime 
types, such as property crimes are pooled in the category of ‘other crimes’ and as the drunk 
driving statistics known to the police would be an interesting addition to the dependent 
variables, they are included in the traffic crimes. While this absence of more accurate 
statistics is partly a choice between multiplying the workload and diminished statistical 
power, I firmly believe that this kind of setup is enough to identify plausible relationships 
with crime and alcohol supply in Finland. That is unless the time span of six years after the 
legislative change is too short, which leads to another issue:  If there is a mechanism between 
crime and alcohol supply, how fast does it show in the crime rates? Is the effect of alcohol 
supply lagged?  
Also endogeneity bias3  and omitted variable bias4 have to be considered. Which came first, 
alcohol or crime, and are these factors intertwined in some unobserved factors. Is there some 
selection, in which individuals that committed crimes had gathered in areas with more 
concentrated alcohol supply or did the alcohol supply concentrate in such areas for some 
policy reasons (or did the alcohol supply concentrate in more stable areas in which less crime 
occurs)? Are there some unobserved external factors that might explain crime rates and 
alcohol availability or are there some unobserved factors that affect how crime was reported 
or perceived? For example the major urbanization that took place especially during this period 
might be correlated with both of these. More accurate municipal statistics regarding 
employment, age & gender distributions and the amount of minorities such as Swedo-Finns in 
                                                 
3 Endogeneity bias refers to an explanatory variable being correlated with the error term thus causing bias in the 
regression results. This might be due an omitted variable, reverse causality (e.g. does a private school improve its 
student’s grades or are the students that good to begin with) or due to a measurement error.  
4 Omitted variable bias refers to the absence of a relevant explanatory variable, which causes bias in the 
regression results. In order to cause bias, the omitted variable has to be correlated with the dependent variable at 
least one explanatory variable. Thus omitted variable bias is a plausible source of endogeneity bias.  
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the municipal area5 could be useful in identifying differences in both alcohol availability and 
crime rates.  
Indeed, one factor to be considered is the efficiency/perceptiveness of the police. There 
definitely were and still are regional differences on the perceptive capabilities of the police 
force. Personally I think this might correlate quite well with the municipal area and the 
population density (compare drunk driving in Helsinki vs Inari), although certain crime types 
might be less affected by these kind of differences in perceptiveness, e.g. non-complainant 
offences such as offences against one’s life. 
There are efforts in order to control these issues: The unobserved municipal factors can be 
dealt in two categories; I) the time-consistent factors and II) the time-inconsistent factors. The 
time-consistent omitted variables that might have explanatory power in explaining municipal-
level crime differences are tackled with fixed effects –approach, which takes care of time-
invariant municipal levels of crime in the form of a dummy variable for each municipality. 
The time-inconsistent factors, such as the size of the municipal car fleet or maybe the 
municipal police resources on the other hand might prove a bit problematic, as the only way 
to control these is to insert some additional variables to the models. Last but not least it must 
be noted that there is at least minor endogeneity related to the location decisions of alcohol 
supply and this endogeneity will be dealt in its respective chapter. Other issues are further 
discussed throughout the thesis or ultimately in suggestions for further studies.   
                                                 
5 A personal observation while compiling the statistics: Swedo-Finnish municipalities generally seemed to have 
smaller crime rates.  
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2 Research question  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
How did the asymmetric permanent alcohol supply shocks, in the forms of 
Alko stores and licensed premises, affect municipal crime rates before and 
after Keskiolutlaki? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
The main interest of the research question consists of studying how the increased alcohol 
supply shows in the population adjusted municipal crime statistics especially in the rural 
Finland (different crime rates as dependent variables). The focus lies in the asymmetrically 
distributed Alko stores and licensed premises, while a secondary interest is how the medium-
strength beer, which swept across the land, affected the crime rates. The tools used in 
identifying this plausible relationship are fixed effects OLS and Poisson regression analyses. 
The Poisson regression is used for the fatal violent offences & attempts at these (murders and 
manslaughters) and for batteries, as they are relatively rare events in the municipal scale, 
which can cause major biases in linear regressions.  
The main explanatory variables used in estimating this relationship with crime and alcohol 
supply are as follows: Annually estimated municipal distance to the nearest municipality with 
an Alko store and the presence of licensed premises in the municipal area, which is taken into 
consideration in the form of a dummy variable (gains the value one if there are any licensed 
premises in the municipal area). Additionally there is a dummy variable for controlling other 
changes of the increased alcohol supply introduced by Keskiolutlaki (such as lowered age 
limits, and the introduction of places serving only medium strength beer). This dummy is used 
as an interaction variable with the distances to Alko stores and the dummies expressing 
licensed premises in the municipal area in order to distinguish the effect of the legislative 
change on them.  
The second issue of interest is how the rural municipalities reacted to the alcohol supply, as 
there might be differences with the cities and the rural municipalities on how the alcohol 
induced crime comes into existence. The prohibition that existed in the rural municipalities 
before the legislative change was implemented, as there was concern that the uncivilized rural 
folk could not handle alcohol and that the countryside would be ridden with alcohol indecent 
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ailments. While this might be valid, this also raises concern regarding the statistical inference: 
The decisions on alcohol licenses and Alko stores were ultimately made by the alcohol 
monopoly’s supervisory board and thus they were not randomly assigned to the 
municipalities. This may cause some problems related to the regressions above and thus the 
endogeneity caused by the decision making process is further scrutinized with a differences-
in-differences based research setup: A quasi-experimental setup is considered in estimating 
the impact of the locations in which the alcohol supply was directed after the legislative 
change. The municipalities will be divided into different dummy categories in the following 
manner: Rural municipalities which received Alko stores after the legislative change will act 
as the treatment group, while the other rural municipalities without Alko stores and cities 
which had Alko stores before the legislative change will be used as two separate control 
groups in estimating the plausible differences how the crime levels in these municipalities 
reacted to alcohol supply. More of the specifics and justification of this setup will be dealt 
with later on.  
In addition to the variables mentioned, other variables considered are municipal population 
densities, a time trend and dummy variables expressing changes in speed limit legislation in 
certain regressions. The time-invariant municipal differences in crime rates are tackled with 
the fixed effects regressions, which attempt to isolate the time-invariant municipal-level 
differences related to different crime types. Finally, Åland and archipelago municipalities are 
omitted from the regressions and the statistics due to being geographically too different. 
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3 Historical background: Kekkonen era Finnish alcohol politics 
Alcohol has been a continuing source of debate and in the Finnish politics since the days of 
early independence and the most recent parliamentary elections (2015) did not deviate from 
this continuum. Despite the fact that public scrutiny rises its head in semi-regular intervals (or 
due to it), there have been only three major legislative overhauls regarding alcohol availability 
in the Finnish history: The introduction of prohibition in 1919 and its ending in 1932, the 
liberation of the sales of medium-strength beer and the sales in the rural municipalities in 
1969, and the changes in Alko Inc.’s monopoly position in 1995 brought by the European 
Union. Of these three, I will focus solely on the changes introduced with the Keskiolutlaki. 
Instead of going that much into the legislative jargon, I am going to go through the incentives 
behind and major changes introduced by Keskiolutlaki on the supply of alcohol, the supply 
side’s impact on the demand and the further implications of the increased demand. 
Additionally, I take a brief overview on how the overall criminality changed during 1960-
1975 in respect to the alcohol supply network in order to give justification on the subject.  
3.1 Keskiolutlaki (462/1968)  
The general opinion on the alcohol political environment had been altered in the rather long 
run and by the end of the 60s, after a long mental tug-o-war between the liberals and the 
temperance movement, the main parties reached an understanding and the parliamentary vote 
favoring the new law resulted in a 137-33 victory (Häikiö, 2007).  
Historian Martti Häikiö goes through the background factors of the new law in his 2007 book 
“Alkon historia” (“The History of Alko”), The principle section of the new law describes the 
changed attitudes quite well: As the principle section of the previous law was centered on the 
overall minimization of alcohol consumption, now it was centered on the minimizing the 
damages of alcohol, not the consumption itself. The damage minimization process was meant 
to be done in the form of redirecting consumption to milder alcoholic drinks, mostly to 
medium-strength beer, which gives the law its name. (Häikiö, 2007) 
Häikiö also writes that it was also seen by the then MP, future director general of Alko Inc., 
Pekka Kuusi that the monopoly had failed in changing the consumption habits of the Finnish 
people (to favor milder alcohol, as consumption of hard liquor was seen as the biggest 
problem) and that the state’s opportunities for changing the “sensitive and intimate 
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relationship between man and alcohol” were limited. Individual freedom and responsibility 
were emphasized.  
As for the almost prohibition-like conditions in the rural municipalities, according to Häikiö, 
the main incentive for the liquor store-free countryside had been the 19th century -oriented 
view of protection the degenerate peasants from the dangers of alcohol, which was not 
thought to be a valid concern anymore. As a matter of fact, he states that Alko Inc. was one of 
the major driving forces for the equal treatment of the rural areas, although all the parties 
agreed that cautionary measures were in order. Pekka Kuusi, wrote in his preparation memo 
that the store program must be carefully measured in order to secure a steady and gradual 
alcohol political development despite the joint effect of medium-strength beer and the new 
supply channels (Häikiö, 2007). 
Below are tabulated the major changes which led to fierce improvements on the supply of 
alcohol: 
 
Table 1. The main legislative changes introduced by the Keskiolutlaki 
 (Häikiö, 2007) 
Estimations on the consumption changes by the new legislation were made by Alko Inc. and 
its directorate. MP Pekka Kuusi estimated that the consumption would rise somewhere 
Väkiviinalaki (1932–1968) Keskiolutlaki (1969–1995)
Age limits Strict age limit of 21 years for all 
alcohol purchases.
Purchase limit of 18 years for alcohol 
under 22 % ABV. No restrictions for 
ages 20 and over. 
Supply outside the 
Alko network
No retail store sales. Restaurant sales 
limited to cities and city-like 
municipalities.
Retail store sales for alcohol under 
4.7 % ABV.  More liberal legislation 
for Cafes and restaurants (petrol 
stations added in 1970). Rural 
limitations removed.    
Alko network 
coverage
Limited to cities and city-like 
municipalities.
Expanded to the rural municipalities.
Restrictions in 
demand 
Viinakortti (liquor card), a tool for 
regulating purchases applied to 
different alcohol types (limitations 
were frequently changed throughout 
its existence).  
Purchase restrictions abolished for all 
vines and beers, Viinakortti itself 
abolished in 1971, although some 
restrictions apply until 1986.   
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between 10 and 15 % on the first year, and that the use of hard liquor would eventually 
diminish to favor beer and wines. Director general K.A. Fagerholm concurred that the 
increased sales would focus on beer and wines. (Häikiö, 2007) According to Häikiö, there 
were naysayers also: Researcher Klaus Mäkelä estimated to the parliamentary alcohol 
committee in 1966, that the changes will probably not shift consumption away from the hard 
liquor, as was pursued, but he also agreed to the general opinion that the patronage regarding 
alcohol control must be ended.  
3.2 The aftermath 
The consumption was not expected to rise in the way it did after Keskiolutlaki entered into 
force. As a peculiar fact, Alko Inc. chose to use logarithmic scale on its consumption related 
graphs in order to make them look less steep (Häikiö, 2007). Illustrated below is the 
consumption of 100 % alcohol per capita ages 15 and over:  
 
 Figure 1. Alcohol consumption per capita aged 15+ (pure ethanol)  
 (National Institute for Health and Welfare, 2014) 
 
  
 
 12 
As we see from the figure above, the consumption rose in two batches, first it took an instant 
charge upwards and secondly over the course of five or so next years it grew a bit more 
steadily before reaching a steady state of sort for a decade. The immediate impact was that 
altogether the annual Finnish alcohol consumption rose by 46 % in just one year (Oy Alko ab, 
1970). The undocumented and thus estimated consumption consists of alcohol exported to 
Finland by travelers, smuggling of alcohol, legal and illegal home production and the alcohol 
consumed by Finns outside the Finnish borders. If we take a closer look at the consumption 
and unfold it by alcohol types, in Figure 2 below, a pattern can be seen:  
 
Figure 2. Alcohol consumption by alcohol types per capita aged 15+ (pure ethanol) 
(National Institute for Health and Welfare, 2014) 
 
The first impression is that the law was partially a success considering its target to substitute 
hard liquor with milder alcohol: At first beer did surpass hard liquor as the most popular 
beverage. Straightforward interpretation however tells us that there was no actual substitution: 
The fact that the overall consumption of both beer and hard liquor rocketed, dilutes this initial 
success and the fact that it took hard liquor a few years to surpass beer again dilutes this even 
more. Although, it must be noted that while the overall consumption rose, we should take into 
account how the consumption changed between persons that previously had very limited 
access to alcohol opposed to persons that had more access to alcohol.  
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Back to the straightforward interpretation; indeed, beer consumption rose immediately on a 
whole new level and continued to grow more steadily in the coming years, while the hard 
liquor consumption took roughly five years to settle into its steady state (until the next shock). 
This is probably due to the fact that while the medium-strength beer was made roughly 
available to the whole of Finland, the Alko network started carefully and asymmetrically 
(actually the beer-network surpassed almost whole of Finland, as some rural municipalities 
initially lacked licensed restaurants/cafes and thus petrol stations were allowed to sell beer 
with certain precautions starting from 1970 (Häikiö, 2007)). 
The next interesting issue is where the consumed alcohol was purchased: From retail stores 
(including Alko stores and groceries) or from licensed premises (restaurants, bars, cafes and 
eventually those petrol stations): 
 
 Figure 3. Alcohol consumption by purchase places per capita aged 15+ (pure ethanol)  
(National Institute for Health and Welfare, 2014) 
 
It is fairly evident that the consumption boost favored retail sales more, while the licensed 
premises also received a minor nudge upwards. While a mighty part of the retail sales boost 
was undoubtedly caused by the licensed retail stores selling only medium-strength beer, 
Figure 2 indicates that a big part of retail sales boost must come from the Alko sales. 
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So the supply and the consumption both rose, but in terms of the research question, how does 
this all go with crime?   
 
Figure 4. Alko stores and licensed premises in relation to average municipal crime 
 
Illustrated above are crimes known to the police6 in relation to the amount of licensed 
premises and in relation to the amount of Alko stores. The licensed premises that could serve 
                                                 
6 The crimes known to the police that are announced as per capita are taken from the municipal records and 
announced per capita (crimes/1000 persons) and are calculated annually in the following manner: 
∑
1
𝑛
(
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎
+ ⋯ +
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑛  𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎
)𝑛𝑖=1  
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only medium-strength beer that were introduced in 1969 are excluded from the above (see 
figure 5).  
What can be interpreted, is that there might be a lagging positive trend in the relation of crime 
and the alcohol supply network. We have to bear in mind that not all the crimes are 
potentially influenced by alcohol, and thus this serves as a very preliminary sign that there are 
plausible results to be found. Another fact to consider regarding the increased crime is that it 
might also be due to the population changes. After WWII the Finnish society went through 
baby booming, and this is likely to reflect in the crime rates. To take this into account, some 
adjustment should be made to the municipal age distributions regarding the citizens that are 
“capable of crime” or criminally liable but, alas, I could not get my hands on statistics on such 
municipal age distributions. To analyze this further, below is presented the average municipal 
crime per capita in relation to the places serving only medium-strength beer (both retail stores 
and licensed premises).  
 
Figure 5. Medium-strength beer serving outlets in relation to average municipal crime 
 
What is noteworthy, is that the amount of retail stores selling medium-strength beer starts off 
relatively high and comes down in just a few years, as for the licensed premises selling beer, 
the number is quite steady. Possible reasons for this might be urbanization (less need for 
stores) or the immediate saturation of the market that occurred in 1969. When comparing to 
the other graphs, there seems to be no immediate positive relationship with the amount of 
medium-strength beer outlets and crime, rather a negative one.  
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What have we learned here? Well, overall the alcohol supply, alcohol consumption and the 
overall crime levels rose throughout the years, but there is little we can say about the causality 
yet. Additionally we cannot rule out, that if alcohol supply has an effect on the municipal 
crime levels, it might have at least a partially lagging effect, e.g. due to the effects of longer 
misuse, but unfortunately the statistics used in this study are limited only for the initial six 
years after the legislative change.  
3.3 Alcohol supply location decisions and endogeneity 
The location decisions related to the alcohol supply were controlled by the alcohol monopoly. 
The key question is ‘did such guidelines exist that affected how the alcohol supply was 
located?’ That is, were alcohol serving outlets located in such fashion that they would 
potentially cause as little harm as possible pre-and post Keskiolutlaki and if such location 
decisions were made, how successful were they? Is there an omitted factor which both 
determined how alcohol sales were directed and at the same time dampened criminal activity? 
The question regarding endogeneity is important, as failure to identify such relationships with 
the locations and crime, could cause bias in the regressions and false interpretations. 
Speculation aside, I have gathered some evidence that the location decisions of alcohol 
serving outlets were not randomized, and thus certain assumptions might not apply for the 
regressions. Here I will gather information on how licenses were granted and Alko stores 
were established pre- and post-1969.  
Before 1969 the alcohol monopoly had the right to sell alcohol in cities and city-like 
municipalities (Väkijuomalaki 9.2.1932/45, § 28). After Keskiolutlaki came into force the 
permitting of alcohol sales in any form was a decision of the municipal (city) council. After 
the permit had been given by the municipal council, the supervisory board of Alkoholiliike 
(the then Alko Inc.) would grant the licenses or determine whether an Alko store could be 
established in the municipality (Alkoholilaki 26.7.1968/459, § 29).  
After 1969, some municipal councils did not allow the sales of alcohol in their region, but 
they were a minority comprised of small municipalities, and thus their existence is 
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acknowledged, but it is neglected in the regressions7. The municipal councils also had the 
right to abolish the granted rights for sales, and the first municipalities did so in 1974. 
However these municipalities were also very small in general and these negative decisions 
were mostly revoked by the coming of 1980s due to economic reasons. (Turunen, 2002) 
(Peltonen;Kilpiö;& Kuusi , 2006) 
Pre-1969, according to the law, the alcohol monopoly would organize the retail sales and the 
licensed premises. Retail sales it did organize all by itself, but it could however grant 
temporary licenses to establish premises to outside parties, such as companies or private 
persons. These outside licenses were in force for three years in cities and for one year in rural 
areas. In the year 1963, out of the 623 operating licensed premises, 594 fell in to the 
temporary licenses -category, making the alcohol monopoly more like an organizer of licenses 
instead of an organizer of the premises as stated in the law. The law also stated that the 
alcohol sales were to be organized in such a manner that the consumption of liquor should be 
reduced to an absolute minimum and that drunkenness and its baleful affects are prevented. 
(Lampela, 1964)  
Opposed to the Alko stores, licensed premises could be established in the countryside with 
certain presuppositions: Hotels and transportation devices, such as cruise ships, that were 
deemed important enough for travelers, could serve alcohol. (Väkijuomalaki 9.2.1932/45, § 
30)   
The letter of the law, nor any source of mine does not indicate that pre-1969 there were any 
other limiting decrees for alcohol supply location decisions, other than the fact that alcohol 
serving outlets could mostly be established in cities only. In addition, Häikiö (2007) states that 
the first Alko stores were established pretty much wherever there was available space, and 
from between the lines, I interpret that the location elements were not in the limelight in the 
process of attempting to ‘reduce the consumption of liquor to the absolute minimum and 
preventing drunkenness and its baleful affects’, not at least in the cities, where alcohol could 
be served.  Rather other measures were used in saving the citizens: Häikiö indicates that 
buying alcohol was made, well if not as awkward as possible, then quite awkward. In Alko 
                                                 
7 Municipalities of Ähtävä and Luoto (Peltonen;Kilpiö;& Kuusi , 2006) 
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stores, there were limitations in retail quantities and the service was made awkward and 
troublesome with no visible bottles (except for the bottoms of the flasks), no 
recommendations and almost totalitarian surveillance of the customers. There were even 
detectives tasked with finding possible alcohol abusers. The licensed premises were also 
picky on their customers and the consumption was supervised with almost ritual-like 
behavior.  
As for the license decisions made by the supervisory board of the alcohol monopoly pre-1969, 
there is only evidence that the board favored more classy restaurants over common joints. 
Below we can see the division of the alcohol serving rights granted by different licenses 
before and after Keskiolutlaki entering into force.  
 
Table 2. The license types and their respective amounts in 1963 and 1970  
(Lampela, 1964) (Häikiö, 2007) 
 
As we can see from the above, the existing premises were mostly limited to the A-rights 
category both before and after 1969. After the legislative change and by the end of 1969, most 
of the former B- and C-rights premises were converted one notch up, with the C-rights 
completely abolished (Häikiö, 2007). In addition to their drink selection, the licensed 
premises were also categorized in standards of service, which equals price categories. The 
Väkiviinalaki (1932–1968) Amount in 1963
A-rights (including  
club rights) 
All drinks                                                
(club rights: all drinks, alcohol serving 
limited to the members of the club; 
augmented club rights: serving also to 
the club guests) 
458
B1- & B2-rights B1, maximum of 25 % ABV               
B2, maximum of 17 % ABV
127
C-rights Malt drinks 38
Keskiolutlaki (1969–1995) Amount in 1970
A-rights All drinks 930
B- rights Maximum of 25 % ABV 171
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profit margin from the sales of alcohol was controlled by the law, and the fancier the place, 
the more profit the law enabled to take (Lampela, 1964). While I could find no proper 
statistics of the price division, Häikiö (2007) states that the amount of cheaper A-rights 
premises went up after the legislative change, thus addressing the concerns that Lampela 
stated in the ‘1963 yearbook of Oy Alkoholiliike ab,’ stating that the pricier and fancier joints 
were over-represented to the places that the common preferred or afforded, which he saw as 
intentional strategy. 
As there were no clues of intentional locational limiting of alcohol sales in the cities pre-1969, 
post-1969 tells a different story.  As stated ample times before, the limitations to alcohol 
serving outlets were torn down, yet there were new guidelines to consider. 
The then-new law states that the retail sales of alcohol could be allowed in municipalities of 
which the municipal council had agreed upon to. In addition to the prior legislation, the new 
law took a stance how the location decisions should be handled: The retail and licensed 
premises sales had to be limited to such population or business centers that the supervisory 
board of the alcohol monopoly deemed necessary considering the municipal population, the 
distance to the closest alcohol serving retail store or licensed premise and other factors. 
(Alkoholilaki 26.7.1968/459, § 29, 39, 40)  
On a side note, the licenses and retail decisions seemed to be processed separately if it does 
not stick out from the wording, the process just was similar. Unfortunately, I did not find the 
exact guidelines for this location approval process, the closest such thing comes from Häikiö 
(2007), who states that Alko Inc. used volume and distance factors in placing the new Alko 
stores to the rural municipalities, and that the aggregate factors settled the store locations. As 
a conclusion, the approach regarding the alcohol supply location decisions was changed quite 
a lot with the legislative change. Previously the guidelines were on a rather macro-level, with 
the aim to exclude the rural people from alcohol (and to some extent the city commoners too). 
After the legislative change, the guidelines went into a more micro direction with the 
population and distance instructions. 
What can we say about the endogeneity related to these location decisions? Certainly the 
location process was not random, that much can be stated. Will this affect the tools used and 
introduced in the next chapter or the integrity of the results? Perhaps, but it must be noted that 
on a municipal level, the main aims after the legislative change seemed to be: I) keep the 
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alcohol supply not clustered and II) satisfy the local demand beyond certain threshold. This is 
not randomized, nor is it pure competition, but I have found no signs that there were other 
external factors that affected the location decisions, such as unemployment rates or 
demographic factors. Alcohol supply seemed to be maintained on a rather steady density, with 
municipalities with lower populations maybe hindered.  
All in all, this is not a hopeless setup for an empirical study. The endogeneity of these 
location decisions will be further discussed in chapter 5.4.1.  
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4 Previous studies on alcohol availability and crime 
The previous chapter focused on loose graphical analysis of the amounts of alcohol outlets in 
relation to overall crime per capita. However there are ample studies that researched the subtle 
relation on alcohol availability and crime (especially violent crimes) and I will skim through a 
select few of them. 
Richard A. Scribner, David P. MacKinnon and James H. Dwyer have “The Risk of Assaultive 
Violence and Alcohol Availability in Los Angeles County” (1995). As implied by the article’s 
name, the rates of assaultive violence were studied in 74 cities in Los Angeles with alcohol 
outlet density, ethnicity structures, economic structures and age structures as their main 
explanatory variables. Their findings demonstrate a geographic association assaultive 
violence and the density of alcohol outlets with all the 74 cities in the Los Angeles County 
(both with off-sale and on-sale outlets). They however stress that the study is not able to 
control cross-boundary purchases. In addition to outlet density, the unemployment rates, the 
rate of males aged 20-29 or 40-44, and the rate of certain minorities in the city were strongly 
related to the violence rates. Scribner &al. also notify that cross-sectional relations with 
alcohol outlet density and other alcohol-related outcomes have been detected, which include 
civil offenses, alcohol related mortality and alcohol involved motor vehicle crashes. 
A more recent study from the United States however shows a bit different results. Paul J. 
Gruenewald &al. have contributed to the subject with the article: “Ecological Models of 
Alcohol Outlets and Violent Assaults: Crime Potentials and Geospatial Analysis” (2005), 
which broadens the scope from Los Angeles to the whole state of California.  The findings of 
the article state that the population and place characteristics contribute more to the assault 
rates than the alcohol outlets do. The assault rates are greater in densely populated, poor 
minority urban areas and in the areas adjacent to these.  The rates were also significantly 
related to off-sale outlets in all regions, but only to on-sale outlets in the unstable poor 
minority-inhabited areas. This can be interpreted as the alcohol outlets having more profound 
effect on violent assaults with certain prevailing sociodemographic groups.  
The effect of alcohol outlets on violence is further supported with more studies in different 
states (Texas, New Jersey), which found supporting results regarding sociodemographic 
factors and alcohol outlet density (see L. Zhu &al. (2004) & Speer &al. (1998)). There is also 
an article from Finland “Väkivaltarikokset ja alkoholi” by Martti Lehti and Reino Sirén 
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(2008) which states that majority of batteries and fatal offences are done under the influence 
of alcohol. The article focuses on the more recent years, and states that the amount of batteries 
done under influence took a steep and permanent rise during the years 1994-1996, while the 
amount of exported alcohol (and thus “undocumented consumption”) rose with the liberated 
legislation. Also in recent years approximately 80% of all fatal offences and attempts at these 
are done under the influence of alcohol. Robberies are also considered: Approximately half of 
the robberies are done under the influence of alcohol. 
The focus has been on violence, but how do other crimes do in comparison? The fact is that 
most studies are concentrated on violence, but at least one expands the scale to property 
crimes and overall crimes. Kabena Gyimah-Brempong (2001) shifts the focus to the rust belt, 
more precisely to the city of Detroit and finds that in addition to violent crimes, the total 
crime and property crime rates also have a significant positive relationship with alcohol 
availability, while controlling and sociodemographic and -economic factors.  
To reflect these findings on the scope of this thesis and on the scope of Finland in the turn of 
70s: There are no major ethnic minorities not at least in the same scope as in the U.S., so I do 
not think that this poses a threat to my thesis. Instead, municipal-level sociodemographic and 
–economic distributions, such the unemployment figures and the age and gender cohorts, sure 
could have come handy. Instead of going ahead of schedule on contemplating what kind of 
statistics I do not possess, let us move onwards to what I have actually gathered with the 
introduction to the empirical approach. 
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5 Empirical approach 
5.1 Acquisition of data 
The data used in this study was acquired from two major sources: I) the criminality known to 
the police statistics from 1960 to 1975 (Central Statistical Office, 1960-1971) (Central 
Statistical Office of Finland, 1972-1975) and II) the year books of Oy Alko Ab 1960-1975 (Oy 
Alkoholiliike ab, 1960-1969) (Oy Alko ab, 1970-1975). The statistics are limited to the years 
1960-1975 due to direct personal incapability to process more data (tenosynovitis) and due to 
the fact that a longer data set would have required much more control measures in order for 
the results to be consistent (municipal amalgamations, legislative changes just to name a few 
difficulties). Without further introductions; the data gathered from criminality known to the 
police consists of the following for the consequent years8: 
Overall crimes in the municipality in a given year   
Murders, manslaughters and attempts at both of these in a given year (pooled together pre 
1970 in the statistics books, so in order to have consistency the statistics are pooled together 
post 1970) 
Assaults (minor and major) in a given year (pooled together pre 1970 in the statistics books, 
so in order to have consistency the statistics are pooled together post 1970) 
Traffic crimes in a given year (post 1970 drunk driving was announced separately in the 
statistics books, but in order to have consistency, the statistics are pooled with all traffic 
crimes)  
                                                 
8 I’d like to extend my gratitude to three persons that helped me in the grueling processing of the data: Marja 
Luukkonen, Anna Pinomaa and Pasi Saukkonen. I could not find the data presented below in any digital form, 
and my attempts with optical character recognition went in vain.  
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Drunk arrests in a given year (not listed in the overall crimes in the municipality as not a 
crime itself)  
Population in the municipal area in a given year 
What is noteworthy, is that even though the crimes against property were announced in the 
statistics books, I did not gather them due to the sheer amount of labor it would have taken 
(however there is a workaround, see the variables used in the regressions in the next 
subchapter and the proposals for further studies as well). Also as stated earlier, the crime 
types were initially announced in a rather general level (e.g. overall traffic crimes), so the 
more precise numbers introduced later had to be pooled according to the initial form. 
Anyway, from the year books of Alko Inc. I have gathered the following data for the 
consequent years: 
Amount of Alko stores in the municipality in a given year  
Amount of licensed premises in the municipality in a given year 
From 1969 onwards, statistics existed for licensed places serving only medium-strength beer 
and for licensed retail stores serving only medium-strength beer. However, I chose not to 
include them for two reasons:  
I) the statistics were not comparable as they were first announced in sales territories 
(≠municipality, rather some cluster of municipalities which I found no clear definitions for) 
and II) the outlets serving medium-strength beer were pretty much everywhere (see figure 5 
on page 15 about the initial surfacing of roughly 20 000 places providing medium-strength 
beer in 1969).  
There are bigger asymmetries related to the Alko stores and the other licensed premises to be 
exploited statistics-wise and as these are municipally controlled in the statistics in use, I will 
introduce a dummy variable that tries to capture the other essential changes introduced by 
Keskiolutlaki. I acknowledge that the omitting of medium-strength beer supply network is a 
liability in terms of the statistical power and might even be a source for omitted variable bias, 
but the dummy variable will help to combat this (more of this in the chapter 5.2). 
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Finally, it must be admitted that there are limitations especially with the criminality known to 
the police data: The municipalities are clustered according to the hundreds (county divisions, 
kihlakunta in Finnish) from 1960 to 1970, and thus I had to pool the later data according to 
these hundreds in order to have consistency. Later municipal amalgamations and changes in 
the statistical bookkeeping are also taken into consideration with the pooling process. The 
process is done according to the information regarding municipal amalgamations provided by 
the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (2015, Kuntaliitto).  
5.2 Variables defined & descriptive statistics 
The data compiled by me is available upon request. It is by no means easily approachable, but 
a separate record is kept of all the municipal amalgamations and corresponding adjustments of 
the data (both due to real life and statistical bookkeeping). 
5.2.1 Municipal statistics 
Below are listed the variables based on the municipal statistics and their respective descriptive 
statistics. In order to give an overview how the statistics changed, the descriptive statistics are 
listed as municipal averages (𝑛 = 269) for the years 1960 and 1975.  Bear in mind, that the 
municipality X might refer to a single municipality or a municipal cluster that had to be 
pooled according to the hundreds introduced in the ‘60s crime statistics.    
The crime statistics are measured per municipal capita (1000) for the sake of comparability.  
Explained variables:      
Overall crime rates in municipality X/Municipal population (1000): Four different variables 
for the following annual crime rates: Overall crimes, fatal violent offences and attempts at 
these, batteries (major & minor) and traffic crimes. The fatal violent offences consist of 
murders and manslaughters. 
Other crimes in municipality X/Municipal Population (1000): Represents the annual crimes 
that are left after deducing violent crimes and traffic crimes from the overall crimes. This is 
the workaround for property crimes mentioned earlier, although it contains everything from 
conspiracies against the state to animal cruelty. 
Drunk arrests in municipality X/Municipal Population (1000): The annual rate of drunk 
arrests (not a crime itself!).  
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 Table 3. Descriptive statistics of different crime types (years 1960 and 1975)  
*The year 1965 is chosen due to difficulties with statistical bookkeeping (see appendix D) 
The descriptive statistics for the above crime rates are quite reasonable. I will not delve 
deeply into the more general statistical indicators as they speak for themselves better than I 
can. As stated before, the crime figures rise quite a lot during the years, and as for overall 
crimes, the biggest cause for this are the traffic crimes, which are on the rise mostly due to the 
enforcement of speed limit legislation. The medians of different crime types tend to be 
smaller than the means, which explains the skewness figures.  Overall, if we move from more 
general definitions to more precise crime types, the kurtosis tends to grow (except for 
batteries and drunk arrests). All the distributions of the crime variables are positively skewed, 
which means that they are asymmetrical and have a longer right tail. If we speculate that the 
population adjusted municipal crime level is somehow linked with the population densities, 
this is somewhat understandable as the vast majority of the municipal population densities are 
concentrated quite near each other, and are focused on less dense municipalities, while the 
denser municipalities, which are relatively few in numbers, might show as the right tail 
Overall crime/pop. Mean St.dev. Max Min Median Kurtosis Skewness
1960 34.88 18.74 118.29 10.17 28.92 2.85 1.52
1975 97.15 42.75 353.14 31.97 89.75 7.18 1.92
Traffic crime/pop.
1965* 27.04 12.13 74.27 7.68 24.34 1.60 1.18
1975 62.86 34.28 293.71 17.21 56.73 13.74 2.87
Drunk arrest/pop.
1960 15.62 19.85 96.66 0.00 7.00 4.24 2.17
1975 33.49 33.04 152.15 0.00 21.73 2.27 1.64
Other Crime/pop.
1965* 16.05 8.43 65.86 4.26 13.61 5.29 1.83
1975 32.24 18.94 141.86 3.11 27.99 7.53 2.05
Battery/pop.
1960 0.78 0.61 4.37 0.00 0.67 7.20 2.12
1975 2.01 1.30 7.07 0.00 1.75 1.54 1.19
Fatal off. etc./pop
1960 0.04 0.08 0.78 0.00 0.00 29.88 4.33
1975 0.05 0.09 0.52 0.00 0.00 8.10 2.61
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outliers in the crime levels (see the descriptive statistics of municipal population densities 
table. 6). Of course this presumes that the municipal population density is a proxy of the 
municipal crime level, so I will keep this purely at a speculative level.  
As for the kurtosis figures, all the distributions are leptokurtic, which means that their peak is 
higher than a normally distributed variable would be. The greater the number, the higher the 
peak near the mean and the greater the declination around the peak. Exceptionally high peak 
is encountered with fatal offences and attempts at these at 1960, which is understandable as 
vast majority of counts is zero-valued9.  As we take a look at the exceptionally high skewness 
as well, the use of the Poisson regression can be seen justified (more of this in its own 
chapter).  These numbers come down when we reach 1975, thus the distribution is more 
symmetrical. 
To conclude the distribution changes of different crimes, drunk arrests, batteries and fatal 
offences per population become more symmetrically distributed and flatter along the years, 
while the overall crimes’, traffic crimes’ and other crimes’ distributions become increasingly 
asymmetrical and peaked.  
Explanatory variables: 
Distance to Alko store (km): The avian distance from the center of the municipality X to the 
center of the nearest municipality with an Alko store. Estimated annually and thoroughly 
explained in the next subchapter.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of distances to Alko (years 1960 and 1975) 
As seen above, the average distances to Alko drop from 31.30 to 17.25 kilometers during 
1960-1975, and the median distance and standard deviation also drop (see figure 6 on page 32 
                                                 
9 The ‘fatal offences and attempts at these’ are population adjusted even though their median is zero. While this 
might inflate figures in smaller municipalities, this is done in order to give a better estimation of the overall 
aggregated figures. Comparing cities with rural municipalities is more correct with population-adjustment than 
without it. Ultimately this problem is tackled with the Poisson regression.  
Distance to Alko Mean St.dev. Max Min Median Kurtosis Skewness
1960 30.30 32.16 269.20 0.14 24.02 19.41 3.46
1975 17.25 14.44 112.57 0.11 13.54 7.67 1.95
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on how the average distance varied throughout the years). The kurtosis figure comes also 
down and thus the distribution “flattens” throughout the years.  The distribution also becomes 
less skewed with the introduction of more Alko stores. This makes sense, as with more Alko 
stores, the extreme distances become smaller and the distribution becomes more symmetric.  
Licensed premises dummy (1, 0): Indicates that there is at least one licensed premise in 
municipal area in the given year.  Not to be confused with the licensed premises selling only 
medium-strength beer. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of license dummies (years 1960 and 1975) 
First and foremost, it must be noted why the distances of licensed premises are not calculated, 
while the distances to Alko stores are. This is due to the fact that with the licensed premises, 
the consumption of alcohol happened in the municipal area while the alcohol bought from the 
Alko stores could be consumed elsewhere. This supposedly limits the alcohol induced crime 
to the municipalities in which the premises existed. Additionally implementing two different 
distances would prove laborious. 
For the descriptive statistics, the licensed premises become a common sight in the 
municipalities throughout the years, which can be seen from the change in the means and the 
changes in skewness as the distribution changes the orientation of its long tail. 
Keskiolutlaki (1, 0): A dummy indicating Keskiolutlaki’s entry into force. Gains the value of 
1 onwards from 1969. Captures the additional alcohol supply (places serving and selling only 
medium-strength beer) and loosened control (age limits) that came with Keskiolutlaki and is 
used as an interaction term with the distances of Alko stores and licensed premises dummies 
in order to capture the effects of additional alcohol supply and legislative changes on these. 
Distance to Alko store X Keskiolutlaki: Interaction variable in which the Alko store distances 
are paired with Keskiolutlaki entering into force, which is used as a treatment effect in order 
to distinguish the effect of Keskiolutlaki on Alko stores over time. 
License dummy Mean St.dev. Max Min Median Kurtosis Skewness
1960 0.30 0.46 1.00 0.00 0.00 -1.25 0.87
1975 0.92 0.27 1.00 0.00 1.00 7.48 -3.07
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Licensed premises dummy X Keskiolutlaki:  Interaction variable in which licensed premises 
dummies are paired with Keskiolutlaki entering into force, which is used as a treatment effect 
in order to distinguish the effect of Keskiolutlaki on licensed premises over time. 
Population density in municipality X (population/𝒌𝒎𝟐): The annual population or 
municipality X per the municipal area (square kilometers). Used to estimate the effect of the 
municipal population density in crimes. This can be seen as a proxy for the perceptive 
capabilities of the police force with a somewhat underlying assumption that the 
perceptiveness of the police force is reduced in less densely populated municipalities (and 
vice versa). The municipal area is calculated with ArcMap component of the ArcGIS software 
by Environmental Systems Research Institute and the municipal populations are taken from 
the ‘Criminality Known to Police’ –statistics.  
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of population densities (years 1960 and 1975) 
The average population densities rise throughout the years rise as does the standard deviation, 
while the median becomes smaller. This can be seen as a product of the heavy urbanization 
that took place during that time. The distribution also becomes flatter and less skewed to the 
left than before, which means that the distribution of the population density became more 
symmetrical along the years. All, in all, the distributions for both years are highly peaked and 
concentrated to the smaller values.   
Time trend (1-16): Linear indicator for capturing time trends for different regressions for the 
time span of 16 years. 
Speed 19XX (1, 0): Dummy variables indicating speed limits entering into force. These 
variables are used in the regressions that explain traffic crimes and overall crimes. Four 
different variables indicating changes in the speed limits applicable to the whole country, 
gaining the value of 1 onwards from their respective years of entering into force. These are on 
a rather general level, and there were also more minor regional experimentation, but were 
chosen not to be included. No other major traffic legislations entered into force as far as I 
Population density Mean St.dev. Max Min Median Kurtosis Skewness
1960 65.21 213.93 2868.50 0.33 13.70 112.44 9.31
1975 86.11 274.98 3182.49 0.36 11.92 65.73 7.03
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know. In addition, it has to be acknowledged that the size of the vehicle fleet was on the rise, 
which most likely also correlated with the amount of traffic crimes.  
Speed 1968 (1, 0): General speed limits of 110 km/h during summer time and 90 
km/h during winter. (Salusjärvi, 1990) 
Speed 1972 (1, 0): General speed limit of 80 km/h for young drivers. Changes in 
vehicle-based speed limits. (Salusjärvi, 1990) 
Speed 1973 (1, 0): Speed limits shown in road signs for the main roads. The 
general speed limit is 80 km/h unless a road sign suggests _a lower_ limit. 
(Salusjärvi, 1990) 
Speed 1974 (1, 0): Speed limits shown in road signs for the main roads. The 
general speed limit is 80 km/h unless a road sign suggested other speed limits. 
(Salusjärvi, 1990) 
One has to notice that most of the distributions are quite skewed and contain rather extreme 
outliers, and thus for them logarithmic transformation is used in the regressions (more about 
this on Appendix F). 
5.2.2 The distances of liquor stores 
To give a more precise view on how the alcohol supply affected crime and to control 
plausible spillover effects, the distances of Alko stores are taken into consideration. The 
change of distance to the nearest Alko store after the legislative reform itself does not tell that 
much of individual alcohol consumption, but can be used as a proxy to model consumption 
possibilities of alcohol over 4.7 % ABV. Alko Inc. kindly provided me with the annual 
information of individual Alko stores as well as the information on the licensed premises on a 
municipal level (108 Alko stores in 1960, 194 Alko stores in 1975).  
The municipal distances to the nearest Alko stores are computed with the ArcGIS software in 
the following manner (See appendices A and B for a bit more thorough explanation and 
images of the process): 
The central point of each municipality is used to calculate the shortest Euclidian distance to 
the geographic center of the nearest municipality with an Alko store. The corresponding 
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coordinate of the nearest Alko would be the center of the municipality due to sheer 
simplification and due to the fact that obtaining the coordinates for the Alko stores would be 
time consuming as heck, and secondly, if there is anything significant to be found it is found 
with simpler measures.  
If the municipality of residence had an Alko store in its region the estimated distance would 
be zero as the geographical points used in the estimation would be overlapped. In order to 
combat this, basic geometry is used to calculate the distance from the municipal centroid as a 
circle radius of the municipal area which was estimated with the ArcGIS software. This radius 
is then used to approximate the distance in the following fashion:  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑙𝑘𝑜 = 0,5 ∗
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑘𝑜 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
If there are multiple Alko stores in the municipal area, the radius is diminished even more in 
an arbitrary fashion (divided by the number of Alko stores). I do acknowledge that this is a 
work-around, but I think that it reflects reality better than a zero-distance estimates as the 
Alko stores were likely established near clusters of people instead of clusters pinewood, 
moose and other forest critters (even though the somewhat conflicting purpose of Alko Inc. is 
still to make a profit while limiting alcohol consumption).   
There were also certain practical problems related to this distance estimation. Since obtaining 
an older map of the municipal division containing the coordinates necessary for the distance 
estimation in fully digital form is nigh impossible, a newer version from 2015 (National Land 
Survey, Esri Finland , 2015) is used as a base map. The newer map is then aligned with a 
municipal division map of the year 1960 (Maanmittaushallitus, 1960) in a process called 
georeferencing with the ArcMap. The municipal borders are then drawn as polygons 
according to the situation in 1975. As stated earlier, certain municipalities have vanished from 
the face of the Earth since the ‘60s (or rather have been incorporated in other municipalities) 
and also the statistics had to be clustered according the reported statistics from the ‘60s. These 
polygons are drawn according to these facts in mind and are ultimately used in calculating the 
distances to the Alko stores. The calculated distances for each consequent year provided by 
ArcMap are then joined with the other statistics in order to perform the regressions.  
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Below is illustrated the fruit of the distance estimations: How the annual average municipal 
distance to the nearest Alko store has changed over time and how the average municipal crime 
per capita has changed. 
 
Figure 6. Average distance to the nearest Alko store in relation to crime per capita 
As we can see from the graph, the estimated average distance to the nearest Alko store fell 
from 30.29 kilometers to 17.25 kilometers in the course of years, while the average municipal 
crime per capita shifted upwards. Next we are going to delve deeper into this relation among 
others.  
5.2.3 Preliminary observations of graphical interpretation 
Previously we saw how the amount of alcohol outlets rose together with crime, but could not 
determine any relations with the two factors. In order to take this graphical analysis further, 
let us see how the distances to the nearest Alko store went together with crime.  
Below is illustrated a scatter plot regarding municipal population adjusted overall crime in 
relation to given municipality’s distance to its nearest Alko store. The outliers have been 
dropped out to enhance readability (thus there might be some peculiar single observations in 
the graphs). From below we can see how the relation of average municipal crime and distance 
to Alko has shifted along the years 1960, 1969 and 1975.  
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Figure 7.  Scatter plot of municipal distance to the nearest Alko and crime per capita 
(Observations from 1960, 1969 and 1975) 
The distance to Alko shows signs that there might exist a relation with the proximity of liquor 
stores and crime. Horizontally, the points are more dispersed in 1960, while vertically they are 
quite flat. This changes during the years, and while there seems to be no drastic change in 
Alko distances from 1969 to 1975, the average municipal crime levels shift up and become 
more dispersed. Figuratively speaking, the scatter plot goes through a vise and expands in the 
vertical dimension.  
Next up is a graph concerning the relation of municipal crime and population density. In order 
to avoid the scatter plots looking like pixelated porridge, I have chosen to remove the 
observations concerning the year 1969 from the scatter plots hereafter. The reader has to trust 
my word and can place the missing observations somewhere in between the observations of 
1960 and 1975. 
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Figure 8.  Scatter plot of municipal population density and crime per capita  
(Observations from 1960 and 1975) 
While it is evident that the crime levels have shifted upwards along the years, there are no 
clear signs that population density affects them. If we take a look on the left side of the figure, 
which has clusters of low-density municipalities, the crime-levels are highly varied. It must 
also be noted that while the municipalities with higher densities are quite dispersed as well, 
they tend to be located on the upper scale of the scatter plot. As it must be noted that overall 
crimes might not be the best choice for interpreting the role of alcohol induced crimes, next 
we move away from general-level crime to more specific and severe cases of crime: Fatal 
offenses and attempts at these in relation to distances to Alko stores and municipal population 
densities.  
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Figure 9.  Scatter plot of municipal distance to the nearest Alko and batteries 
 (Observations from 1960 and 1975) 
Same kind of observations can be made with batteries as with overall crime. While the crime 
counts are smaller, the “intertemporal through-the-vise-transformation” of the observations 
also applies here. The observations are more horizontally dispersed and vertically more flat in 
1960, while there seems to be more extreme levels of batteries in 1975 when the distances to 
the nearest Alko store have gone down.    
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Figure 10.  Scatter plot of municipal population density and batteries 
 (Observations from 1960 and 1975) 
Yet again, there are more extreme crime levels associated with 1975 and with more dense 
populations, but there are no clear trends among the clusters. The battery-levels seem to shift 
up during the years, but there is no immediately clear trend among the population densities, an 
observation on which I will return shortly.   
Finally, we analyze the relation between the distance to Alko store and municipal population 
density. Below is illustrated the average municipal distance to Alko in relation with 
population density. As stated before, I found evidence that there was a guideline in which the 
Alko stores were placed to satisfy certain demand.  The graph below indicates that there was a 
clear threshold for population densities beyond certain point to be quite near an Alko store. Of 
course this is somewhat self-evident, as municipalities with lower population densities have 
bigger areas and thus bigger distances and so on, but this serves as an indicator that the 
process of assigning new Alko stores most certainly was not randomized in terms of 
population density. 
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Figure 11.  Scatter plot of municipal population density and distance to the nearest Alko 
(Observations from 1960 and 1975) 
Coming back to the relations with crime and population density: Based on the loose graphical 
interpretation, it seems that the distance to Alko is a better indicator of crime than population 
density is, while population density is a quite good indicator of the distance of Alko after a 
certain point. With these in mind, we are going to define a quasi-experimental setup in order 
to better understand how crime, the distance to Alko and the municipalities go hand in hand.  
5.3 Regression used and acknowledged limitations 
The regressions will be performed in Stata and are based on fixed effects –approach. For 
crimes that are plentiful, ordinary least squares linear regression is chosen as the tool, and for 
less abundant crimes, Poisson regression is used. After the regression tools overview, a more 
specific approach will be considered in the form of differences-in-differences regression in 
order to try to address the differences of the cities and the rural municipalities in terms of how 
the alcohol supply caused crime and to scrutinize whether different levels of alcohol supply, 
mostly in the form of Alko stores, affected crime. First I will introduce these regression tools 
in the scope of this thesis. 
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5.3.1 Fixed effects regression 
As stated before, there are loads of omitted variables on the municipal level such as ethnic 
breakdown, employment figures, demographic structures etc., which might have an 
explanatory role in the criminal statistics. In order to have credible results, we need to take 
these unobserved factors somehow into consideration. This is done with the fixed effects 
regression. 
In order to save time and space, I will not go to the specifics of the OLS, instead I will jump 
directly to a generalized equation of a two-period fixed effects model. The following is 
modelled after “Introductory Econometrics – a Modern Approach” by Jeffrey M. Wooldridge 
(2013):  
A two period linear regression is considered:   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿0𝑑2𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (1) 
𝑖 denotes the unit that the statistics are announced (municipalities in this thesis). 𝑡 =
1,2 denotes the time period. 𝑑2𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating year 2. The intercept for t=1 
is 𝛽0 and the intercept for t = 2 is 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is some 
independent variable and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the time-varying or idiosyncratic error that represents the 
unobserved factors that change in time.  
The main component for the fixed effects regression is 𝑎𝑖, which captures all the unobserved 
time-constant factors that affect 𝑦𝑖𝑡. To be specific, the regressions will include a dummy 
indicating every unit that the statistics are announced in. The underlying assumption is that 
these units differ from one another in some unobserved factors and these dummies will try to 
control and isolate the effect of each municipality on crime. As the name of this approach 
states, these unobserved variables that affect different crime rates in different municipalities 
are seen as constant over time and thus different municipalities have fixed effects on crime 
rates. In addition to the fact that 𝑎𝑖  should be fixed in time, another underlying assumption is 
that the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡 should not be correlated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡 nor with 𝑎𝑖 (Wooldridge, 
2013). 
Regarding the 16 year time period, it is highly unlikely that these factors stay absolutely 
constant, but I reckon they will be constant enough. Although, should the regression fail due 
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to explanatory variables being correlated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡, additional time-inconsistent variables 
should be introduced to the fray. Examples of such variables might be municipal police 
resources and municipal car fleets. As for the explanatory variables being correlated with the 
fixed municipality variables: There is some endogeneity related to the location decisions of 
the alcohol supply network as it is not randomized.  Thus 𝑎𝑖 is most likely correlated with 𝑥𝑖𝑡, 
but this is overlooked for now.  
5.3.2 Poisson regression 
All the crime statistics used can be seen as count data, which is fine for OLS when it comes to 
big numbers, but if the incidence to population ratio gets smaller and there are more and more 
zero-valued counts for certain crime statistics, we have some issues to address. This is due to 
the fact that linear regressions make wrong kind of assumptions on how the count data looks 
like on when the observations are few, their mean is small and thus the distribution is likely 
skewed (Grace-Martin, 2010). 
As D. Wayne Osgood states in article “Poisson-based Regression Analysis of Aggregate 
Crime Rates” (2000), OLS is not a very good regression for modelling relatively rare crimes 
for two reasons: First because the precision of the estimated crime rate depends on the 
population size, variation in population sizes across the aggregate units will lead to violating 
the assumption of homogeneity on the error variance (i.e. its variance is not constant among 
observations), which lead to larger errors of prediction on smaller populations. Secondly, 
normal or even symmetrical error distribution of crime rates cannot be assumed when crime 
counts are small or even zero. For small populations, a crime rate of zero is even expected on 
certain crimes and thus OLS can generate a bias that can even lead to negative predictions 
which are theoretically impossible (Crawley, 2007). 
These issues can be addressed with the Poisson regression, which itself is a maximum 
likelihood –based regression, which uses Poisson distribution to observe any number of 
discrete events given an underlying rate of events. The occurrence rate of these events is 
approximately Poisson-distributed, its expected value dependent on explanatory variables. A 
characteristic of the Poisson distribution is that its mean equals its variance. (Smith, 2015)  
The regression is simply modelled as follows: 
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ln(𝜆𝑖) = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=0      (1) 
P(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖) =
𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝜆
𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖!
     (2) 
Equation (1) is a regression equation relating the natural logarithm of the mean and expected 
number of events for case 𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, to the sum of the products of each explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖𝑘, 
which is multiplied be a regression coefficient 𝛽𝑘. The constant, 𝛽0 , is multiplied by 1 for 
each case. Equation (2) shows the probability of 𝑦𝑖 the observed outcome, which follows the 
Poisson distribution. Thus the expected distribution of the incidence counts and corresponding 
distribution of the regression residuals depend on the predicted mean count in (1). The 
regression coefficients reflect proportional differences in incidence rates due to the 
logarithmic transformation. (Osgood, 2000) 
Poisson-based models are built on the assumption that the underlying data takes the form of 
nonnegative integer counts of events, such as crime rates. Osgood states that population 
adjusted Poisson regression presents a more precise estimation than the mere incidence 
counts. In his article, he pits municipal crime counts against population adjusted crime rates: 
As the populations increase, the range of likely crime rates decrease, while yet at the same 
time the range of likely crime counts increases. The population adjustment can be modelled in 
traditional Poisson in the following manner:  
ln (
𝜆𝑖
𝑛𝑖
) = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1       (3) 
ln(𝜆𝑖) = ln(𝑛𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=0     (4) 
𝑛𝑖  is the population size for the unit, 𝜆𝑖 is the expected amount of incidents per a time unit, 
𝑥𝑖𝑘 represents the explanatory variables
10. The population adjusted crime rates adjust the 
amount of opportunity that an event has, as with an increase in the population, the possibility 
of crime can be seen to increase (Grace-Martin, 2012).   
                                                 
10 With Stata the exposure is taken into account with the exposure(varname) –command.  
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Osgood says, that Poisson regression standardized for the municipal population sizes 
acknowledges the greater precisions of rates based on larger populations, and thus addresses 
the problem of the heterogeneity of variance. In other words, Poisson does not assume 
homogeneity of variance, instead it assumes that residual variance is expected to be a function 
of the number of incidents measured. Additionally Osgood states that the zero-values 
presented with low crime rates do not pose a threat to the Poisson regression, while they 
might cause bias in the OLS. Instead of directly predicting the probability of an incident, the 
model computes the probability of the observed count of incidents based on the predicted 
value for the mean count. 
The interpretation of these results is most easily done by calculating the incidence rate ratios 
(IRR), which means, the relative incidence rate of crime as alcohol supply increases in the 
scope of this thesis. This ratio implies the change in the odds if all the other independent 
variables are held constant, except for one. If  𝐸𝑗 is the exposure, the expected number of 
events 𝐶𝑗 will be:  
𝐶𝑗 = 𝐸𝑗𝑒
𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑗+⋯+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑗     (5) 
= 𝑒ln (𝐸𝑗)+𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1,𝑗+⋯+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑗    (6) 
Thus if the dummy-variable 𝑥𝑖  takes the value of 1 in the first observation and 0 in the other, 
the IRR for a one-unit change in 𝑥 is:   
𝑒ln(𝐸)+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+𝛽𝑖(𝑥𝑖+1)+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘
𝑒ln(𝐸)+𝛽1𝑥1+⋯+𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘
= 𝑒𝛽𝑖    (7) 
(StataCorp, 2015) 
As there is an excessive number of zeroes in the municipal violence statistics (both in 
offences & attempts against life and batteries), a valid concern would be why are zero-inflated 
models not in use? This is due to the fact that I do believe that these are “true zeroes”, i.e. 
there is no external factor outside that causes any distortion or downward bias in the 
municipal statistics. These offences just are so rare that there is an ample amount of zeroes in 
the statistics. 
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Another factor that has to be considered, is the so called overdispersion of the observed 
variance, which means that the variance is greater than the mean, which should be equal 
according to the underlying assumption of Poisson distribution. This could lead to the model 
not being appropriate. However, the model is not as weak as it sounds: The presumptions can 
be relaxed with the robust standard errors the estimator of the variance-covariance matrix 
does not assume mean equalizing the variance, nor it does not require homoscedasticity of the 
variance (Gould, 2011) (see appendix E for more information about robust standard errors). 
The fixed effects are also considered with the Poisson regression, which are used in the same 
manner as in OLS regression to control the time-invariant effects of the municipalities.  
5.3.3 Differences-in-differences regression 
The Alko stores are not randomly assigned to different municipalities and thus this is not a 
natural experiment. Some form of control is needed in containing these plausible differences 
that arise with the endogenous direction of the alcohol supply.  
Differences-in-differences (DID) is a tool to estimate treatment effects when comparing the 
pre- and post-treatment differences in the outcome of a treatment and control group and thus 
is a suitable tool to estimate plausible differences in alcohol-induced crime. First I will go 
through the theoretical framework in this chapter and then in the next subchapter I will try to 
form and justify a quasi-experimental setup considering the endogenous nature of the alcohol 
supply and the limitations of the regression models.  
Back to DID, which is quite well illustrated in graphical form: 
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Figure 12. Causal effects in the differences-in-differences model 
 (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) 
In the figure above, there are two states, of which one experiences treatment while the other 
stays the same (the control state). The main idea of the figure goes as follows: 1) Difference 
between the groups’ pre-treatment trends is their normal difference, 2) difference in the post-
treatment trends is their normal difference and causal difference and 3) difference of these 
differences is the causal effect of the treatment. Thus, as the model’s name states, the causal 
effect is interpreted as the difference of the post-treatment and pre-treatments trend 
differences as everything else is held constant. The counterfactual trend refers to the trend 
before the treatment. The key identifying assumption is that the difference of the trends would 
be the same in both states without the treatment (so called parallel trends assumption).  The 
treatment induces a deviation to this pre-treatment trend, which can be interpreted as its causal 
effect. Although the treatment and control trends can differ from each other, their difference is 
captured by the state fixed effects. (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) 
To put this into more mathematical context, Joshua Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke use the 
following example regarding minimum wage legislation’s effect on fast food restaurant 
employment in neighboring states in their book an ‘Mostly harmless Econometrics: An 
Empiricist’s Companion’ (2008). The setting is simple: New Jersey encounters a minimum 
wage lift and Pennsylvania is used as the control state.  
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To model this more formally, take 𝑦1𝑖𝑠𝑡 and 𝑦0𝑖𝑠𝑡, which imply:   
𝑦0𝑖𝑠𝑡 = fast food employment at restaurant i at period t if there is low state minimum wage 
𝑦1𝑖𝑠𝑡 = fast food employment at restaurant I at period t if the is high state minimum wage 
𝑠 denotes state: New Jersey (NJ) and Pennsylvania (PA). t denotes time, of which there are 
two points: February (Feb) and November (Nov). February is seen as the pre-period, before 
the minimum-wage increase, while November is seen as the post-period. These are both 
potential outcomes and in practice we only get to see one or the other, e.g. the latter is seen in 
New Jersey in November. The change of employment in New Jersey is compared to the 
change of employment in PA before and after the minimum wage increase in NJ. The 
minimum wage in PA is the same as in NJ before the legislative change and stays the same in 
both periods.  
Following additive mechanism is used to model the Diff-in-diff approach 
𝐸(𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡│𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡      (1) 
Basically this equation implies that in the absence of a wage change, employment is 
determined by the sum of a time-invariant state effect and a year effect that is common across 
the states. To model wage change into this we introduce a dummy 𝐷𝑠𝑡, which indicates a 
high-minimum wage state. We assume that the employment difference between high and low 
minimum wage states is constant: 
𝐸(𝑌1𝑖𝑠𝑡 − 𝑌0𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠, 𝑡) =  𝛽     (2) 
And if we combine (1) and (2) we get 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡     (3) 
Where 𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡│𝑠, 𝑡) = 0. If we introduce the states: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑃𝐴, 𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑣) −  𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑃𝐴, 𝑡 = 𝐹𝑒𝑏)   (4) 
= 𝛾𝑃𝐴 + 𝜆𝑁𝑜𝑣 − (𝛾𝑃𝐴 + 𝜆𝐹𝑒𝑏) = 𝜆𝑁𝑜𝑣 − 𝜆𝐹𝑒𝑏    
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And for New Jersey, as the 𝐷𝑁𝐽,𝑁𝑜𝑣 gains the value 1:   
𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑁𝐽, 𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑣) −  𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑁𝐽, 𝑡 = 𝐹𝑒𝑏) =  𝜆𝑁𝑜𝑣 − 𝜆𝐹𝑒𝑏 + 𝛽 (5) 
Thus the population difference-in-differences is: 
[(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑃𝐴, 𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑣) −  𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑃𝐴, 𝑡 = 𝐹𝑒𝑏)]  (6) 
− 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑁𝐽, 𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑣) −  𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑠 = 𝑁𝐽, 𝑡 = 𝐹𝑒𝑏) = 𝛽 
And thus 𝛽 can be interpreted as the causal effect of the change. (Angrist & Pischke, 2008) 
Naturally there are limitations to the model. Coming back to the parallel trends assumption 
mentioned earlier: There has to be an identifiable trend before the treatment, as otherwise the 
counter-factual is null and void. If we cannot properly detect the trends before the treatment, 
then we can mistake them for a causal effect even though the treatment would have no effect 
or alternatively we can identify purely random abbreviations in the employment as a trend. 
Thus more observations points are needed in order to identify how the control and treatment 
groups’ trend together in order to prove that there indeed is an identifiable change in the 
trends.  
Another critical issue is appointed by Marianne Bertrand, Ester Duflo and Sendhil 
Mullainathan in their critically acclaimed article “How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-
Differences Estimates?” (2004).  According to them most papers that employ diff-in-diff 
estimations use many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes, yet ignore the 
inconsistent standard errors. I try to acknowledge this issue by identifying plausible 
correlation and taking clustered standard errors (see appendix G for more of this). 
5.4 Defining the experimental design 
Let’s pretend that there exists such a mechanism in which the proximity of alcohol supply 
induces crime. In addition to how the supply induces crime, we are interested in how the 
crime caused by the supply was affected by its location. Although the municipal time-
invariant differences in crime are controlled with the fixed effects approach, the alcohol 
supply locations themselves might affect these crime rates in a way that does not show in the 
municipality fixed crime rates.  
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To put it more precisely: Two plausible sources for such differences arise: I) are the rural 
municipalities and cities different in terms of how crime is induced and additionally II) are the 
rural municipalities in which Alko stores were located and/or licensed premises were allowed 
different from the rural municipalities that received no Alko stores nor licensed premises in 
terms of how they induce crime? The latter concern is valid, if there is such endogeneity 
related to the location decisions that directed the alcohol supply in such municipalities that 
less crime arose. That is, is there an omitted variable(s) that affects how crime is induced and 
is this omitted variable a determinant of how the alcohol supply was directed? Even if I could 
not find any signs of such policy measures, it does not mean that they did not exist. To justify 
these thoughts in a historical perspective, as stated before, a factor to consider is that the 
effects of the alcohol supply might have been profound in the countryside, as before the 
legislative change, the prohibition-like conditions in the countryside were somewhat justified 
by stating that the rural folk could not handle liquor. 
A rather silly example is in order to clarify what I mean with the location differences’ effect 
on alcohol supply: Consider two tennis courts, one of them a clay court and the other one a 
grass court. Both of them are hit with a standard construction stage 3 tennis ball, which 
bounces differently from the surface of these courts. Same kind of thought process can be 
applied to the alcohol serving outlets and the municipalities in which they are introduced: An 
Alko store bounces (or might bounce) differently if it hits a rural municipality rather than a 
city. If the alcohol supply was directed in such a manner, this effect hits the statistical 
inference with a tennis racket. 
If the municipalities in which alcohol supply was directed were somehow different from each 
other, we can try to identify their effect on crime with some kind of an experimental setup 
involving dummy variables that interact with other variables indicating alcohol supply. With 
this kind of setup we should be able to control how the ‘choice of court affected the bounce’.  
If the interaction variables have different coefficients that are statistically significant, we can 
see that there are differences on how they respond alcohol supply.  
The following sub-chapters focus on in forming this experimental design and in analyzing 
preliminary significance of the chosen design. 
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5.4.1 The trouble of defining a solid experimental design  
As stated before on chapter 3.3, the Alko stores were not randomly assigned and thus there 
needs to be some form of design that takes care of the related endogeneity. After declaring 
that there is a plausible problem with endogeneity related to the location decisions of alcohol 
outlets and therefore plausible differences on how different municipalities reacted to this 
supply in terms of crime, the next problem is how to measure or define the “difference” of 
these municipalities? First and foremost, it must be stated that the ultimate quasi-experimental 
setup that is used in the regressions can be seen as somewhat crude, and thus I will go through 
how and why it came to shape. Intuition played a major part in defining it. 
The first intuitive approach was to form a treatment group and two control groups out of the 
municipalities according how the distance to the nearest Alko store changed during the time 
period. However this approach was not chosen due practical difficulties explained shortly 
hereafter. The division would have gone as follows (preliminary threshold distances in 
brackets):  
Treatment group: Municipalities of which distance to Alko drastically dropped during the 
time period (from >30 kilometers to <10 kilometers)  
Control group 1: Municipalities of which distance to Alko stayed relatively long during the 
time period (>30 kilometers) 
Control group 2: Municipalities of which distance to Alko stayed relatively short during the 
time period (<10 kilometers) 
The problem with this setup was that no matter how I tried to calibrate the setup, I could not 
form a sufficient treatment group, with the best amount of treatment municipalities I could 
generate limiting to ~10 with highly non-satisfactory distance boundaries. The same did not 
apply for the control groups which would have both consisted of over 50 municipalities. 
Ultimately I had to accept that the data just does not bend for this kind of experimental 
division and a new approach had to be found. 
The second attempt on experimental design was inspired by Figure 11 (p. 37) indicating the 
scatter plot of municipal population densities and distances to the nearest Alko store: What if 
population density could be used as a defining factor on estimating how municipalities react 
to crime. After all, it is clearly linked with the distances to the nearest Alko store. Practical 
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problems also came in the way with this kind of line of thought. These problems are pretty 
well summed up with the cumulative municipal population density figure below. The 
population densities in the above graph are expressed as municipal averages over 1960 to 
1975 (𝑛 = 269).   
 
Figure 13.  Cumulative distr. of the average municipal population densities (1960-1975) 
 
The low-density municipalities are overrepresented as for the municipalities with higher 
population densities are highly dispersed. The question is where to draw lines, when the 
majority of the densities are quite near each other and then highly dispersed when it comes to 
greater values. While it is evident that forming a setup according to the population densities is 
difficult, the solution I found for the experimental design lies within the essence of the whole 
Keskiolutlaki, as it gives an easy way to divide the municipalities itself with the defining 
factors being whether the municipality had an Alko store and when it received it. That is in a 
sense the same way that Alko Inc. defined municipalities eligible for Alko stores, without 
seeing the original list of criteria.  
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_________________________________________________________________________ 
Treatment group: “Rural” municipalities that received an Alko store after the 
legislative change (by 1975). Takes the alias “Alko pre-69” 
Control group I: “Urban” municipalities that already had an Alko store before 
the legislative change (by 1968). Takes the alias “Alko post-69” 
Control group II: “Rural” municipalities that had not received an Alko store 
by 1975. Rest of the countryside. Takes the alias “No Alko” 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
So what do we wish to see with this setup? Essentially three things: 
I) Pre-1969 the crime trends of control groups and treatment groups are quite similar, 
while there may be some fixed differences regarding the crime levels (that the 
fixed effects -approach hopefully tackles). 
II) The crime trend of the treatment group drifts away from control group II post-1969 
as there should be “more alcohol available” in the treatment group. 
III) The crime trend of the treatment group goes in the same direction with control 
group I post-1969 as their alcohol supply network should be similar. 
Considering the overhauling nature of the legislative change, it is evident that if crime is 
affected by alcohol supply, then all of the groups encounter changes in their trends (as 
medium-strength beer hit the streets almost everywhere). The presumed result I) is due to the 
fact, that basically the treatment group should have similar alcohol availability in their 
municipal areas as the control group I (at least at some point after the legislative change). The 
presumed result II) is due to the fact, that the control group II should lack the Alko stores.  
This is not your average diff-in-diff, and honestly I do not even know whether it should be 
called that way, but anyway it has influenced my thought process. The treatment group is 
chosen as it is, as essentially the municipalities in it achieve the same level of alcohol supply 
as the control group 1. Basically, the treatment happens in different points of time and 
different ways (beer joints introduced by Keskiolutlaki, Alko stores, licensed premises). It 
must be also considered that there is always a distance to Alko, and thus all the observations 
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are undergoing “different levels of treatment” in all points of time11.  A thorough overview on 
how the regression coefficients should be interpreted will be presented in appendix H and in 
the findings chapter. 
So in a nutshell, basically there are two things that are achieved with this kind of setup  
I) Without seeing the exact guidelines that made the municipalities eligible for Alko 
stores before and after the legislative change, we have now have an approximation 
of them. 
II) The three groups sum up the different levels of change to alcohol supply that 
occurred across the municipalities. As the Alko stores can be seen as the most 
exclusive source of alcohol, it can be used as a determent factor on whether the 
alcohol supply affected crime levels.  
With this kind of setup, the amount of treatment and control municipalities is thus satisfactory 
(with minimum of 50 municipalities per group). This is a rather basic way to approach the 
problem, but we should be able to solve whether the crime trends in the municipalities that 
received Alko stores post-1969 were different from the crime trends in the municipalities that 
had Alko stores pre-1969 and from the municipalities that did not receive any Alko stores by 
1975. Back to the tennis court analogy, now we have a crude measure whether the choice of 
court affected how the balls bounced back. If there are no differences and at the same time we 
can identify an overall positive correlation on alcohol supply and crime, then we can suspect 
that the Alko stores were deliberately placed in municipalities in which they would cause least 
harm. More about the specifics of this setup can be found on the next subchapter and on 
appendix D.  
There are problems with this setup also: We cannot detect whether a municipality that did not 
receive an Alko store pre-1975, would not have been eligible to receive one. As such, the line 
drawn between the municipalities that received Alko post-legislative change and those that 
did not receive one, is a bit hazy. One way to further distinguish between these municipalities 
would be to take the list of Alko stores established “in the future” and use them per se as the 
                                                 
11 To give a simplified example: Imagine a quasi-experiment that involves non-smokers and smokers and two 
periods, in which after the first some non-smokers begin smoking. All the non-smokers are exposed to different 
levels of passive smoking at both periods, which resonates in the results as spillover effects.  
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treatment group. This however is also a bit hazy, as the criteria used by the Alko Inc. in order 
to place the Alko stores and the municipal conditions that would have made them eligible for 
the stores could have changed along the years. Thus, this is chosen not to be included in the 
experimental design. 
The descriptive statistics for these groups reveal interesting things (see the whole table in 
appendix C). The treatment municipalities’ average distance to Alko drops significantly from 
50.80 kilometers to just under 12 kilometers in the course of years, and while their population 
density is significantly lower than control group I’s,  their net-migration (or birth rate) can be 
interpreted as positive. While there are few licensed premises in these municipalities in 1960, 
there is one in almost everyone by 1975. 
As for the control groups: Group I (which consists of municipalities that had an Alko store 
before the legislative change) has considerable positive population growth while group II -
municipalities tend to lose their inhabitants (no Alko store by 1975). The average distance to 
Alko stays quite low for group I (from roughly 9 kilometers to 5 kilometers), while for group 
II it stays considerably high (over 25 kilometers for the whole time). There are licensed 
premises in almost every municipality in group I to start with in 1960 and at least one in every 
municipality by 1975. For the control group II, there are almost no licensed premises in their 
area in 1960 and 85 % coverage by 1975.  Overall, this seems like an interesting division for 
the municipalities and in sense achieves quite well the spirit that was tried to achieve with the 
preliminary compositions introduced earlier.  
The next chapter will focus on the legitimacy of the differences-in-differences approach on 
different crime types. If there are no noticeable trend changes among the experimental groups, 
then there is no justification for the differences-in-differences design and it will be left out for 
certain crime types. Instead an “ordinary” fixed effects regression will be performed to 
measure the effect of the alcohol supply to the crime levels.  
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5.4.2 Evidence of preliminary significance and other observations  
The parallel trends assumption needs to hold in order for the differences-in-differences 
regression to be of any use. All the figures and interpretation regarding the trends for the 
treatment and control groups are listed in appendix D, while some of them are presented here 
in order to give clarification on what we wish to see. We start off with the average overall 
crime rates with and without the traffic rates.  
 
Figure 14.  Interpreting the group trends for the Diff-in-diff regressions   
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I will cite the previous chapter on what we wanted to see with this setup: 
I) Pre-1969 the crime trends of control groups and treatment groups are quite 
similar, while there may be some fixed differences regarding the crime levels. 
II) The crime trend of the treatment group drifts away from control group II post-
1969 as there should be “more alcohol available” in the treatment group.  
III) The crime trend of the treatment group goes in the same direction with control 
group I post-1969 as their alcohol supply network should be similar 
First observation: The trends of the different groups’ pre-1969 seem to follow each other in 
quite a slavish manner (condition I is satisfied). There are fixed differences regarding the 
groups, but that much was expected.  
Second observation: There is a minor divergence between the treatment group and the control 
group II as the treatment group shifts away 1969. This change of trends can better be seen 
from the lower figure, which has traffic crimes deducted from the overall average crime rates. 
This is something that we wish to see after the treatment period (II is satisfied).  
Third observation: There is no evident difference between the trends of the treatment and 
control group I post-1969 (III can be interpreted as satisfied). The changes in the trends can be 
seen as preliminarily significant and thus the DID-regression is justified. Based on the 
presumptions that are assumed with alcohol-supply and crime, it is also natural that ‘Alko-
pre-69’ -curve shifts after the legislative change as there is also a boost in these 
municipalities’ alcohol supply. 
An additional observation concerns the drop in crime rates mid-60s in the lower figure. The 
level of average overall crime rates excluding the traffic crimes comes down quite a bit in 
1965. This is something that I have missed while I was processing the statistics, and is likely 
related to statistical bookkeeping changes: Some crime type previously not listed as a traffic 
crime started being listed as one (see figures concerning traffic crimes and other crimes in 
appendix D). While this is somewhat irritating, the nuisance is brushed aside by limiting the 
observations for the traffic crimes and other crimes to the years 1965-1975 in the regressions. 
To continue with the graphical interpretation, next we have an example on exactly what kind 
of trend changes we wish to see and exactly what kind of trends we wish to avoid in figure 15, 
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which compares the trend changes of drunk arrests to trend changes in fatal offences and 
attempts at these.  
 
Figure 15. Favorable vs. unfavorable trend changes regarding the Diff-in-diff  
There are more profound trend changes with the population adjusted drunk arrests (arrests 
regarding drunk and disorderly conduct) than with the overall crime rates. As for the murders, 
well, they seem more like a random walk process without a clear drift, which is something 
that we definitely do not wish to see. To conclude: After eyeing the figures containing the 
trends of different subsets, basing the evidence on the graphical interpretation presented in 
appendix D, the differences-in-differences based approach is taken into fruition with the 
following crime rates: Overall crime, other crime, batteries and drunk arrests. 
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There was no graphical evidence that the groups encountered any trend changes regarding 
traffic crimes or fatal offences (and attempts at these) that were presumably caused by 
changes in alcohol supply. Thus for them, regressions without the differences-in-differences 
approach are performed and listed in the appendices, but these regressions will be more like a 
curiosity. See the appendix D for a more thorough thought process for each crime type. 
Besides the graphical interpretation, there are no preliminary significance tests performed for 
the groups. While a nonparametric test (Wilcoxon signed-rank test for instance) might help 
with the paired observations and the evidently present skewness, ultimately the highly 
plausible autocorrelation, which violates the assumption of independence, became the demise 
of preliminary significance testing. (Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, 
1997). The autocorrelation will be considered in the regressions however. 
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6 Empirics: 1960-1975 
Few forewords before the grand finale: As the data contains a lot of approximations and 
arbitrary transformation (although I do hope I have given reasons convincing enough for these 
measures), it must be noted that whatever results there may be found, they must be 
approached with mild to moderate caution. Instead of interpreting the findings as written in 
stone, I will use a very conservative manner in deciphering them. Significance and magnitude 
are more likely reported instead of taking the numbers as godsend. 
In order to fend off heteroscedasticity, skewed distributions and serial correlation, logarithmic 
transformation of variables, robust standard errors and clustering of standard errors are used 
in the upcoming regressions. Appendices E, F and G focus on the specifics of these. Appendix 
H gives more insight on how the coefficients of the interaction variables should be 
interpreted. 
6.1 Findings 
The regressions will be presented in two categories: First overall regressions without the 
experimental group design and then with the design if there was anything significant to be 
found. Unfortunately, the quasi-experimental group setup mostly did not yield any significant 
results, and is mostly excluded from here. The most interesting findings will be reported here 
in a rather efficient manner, while the more insignificant findings can be found in appendix i 
among all the regression results.  
Let us start with the overall crimes. The preliminary trend figure (in appendix D) suggested 
that there would be a minimal shift in the trend of the treatment group (rural municipalities 
that received Alko stores), when comparing with the control groups (cities and really rural 
municipalities). The group-setup regression results however are not presented here, as they 
are largely not significant.  
 
Table 7. OLS results for overall crime 
Pre Post Pre Post
Distance (ln) -0.039 (ns) -0.0038 (ns) Distance (ln) -3.94 -0.38
License (1,0) 0.054 (*) -0.062 (ns) License (1,0) 5.55 -6.012
Keskiolutlaki (1,0) - 0.129 (*) Keskiolutlaki (1,0) - 13.76
Overall crime Overall crime (%)
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The percentages listed in the right hand side table are transformed from the logarithms. The 
distance is used as a direct percentage value (e.g. for the period before Keskiolutlaki, one 
percent more in the distance to Alko equals -~0,039% drop in crime rates, which is the 
distance elasticity of crime), while the dummies’ coefficients are transformed to percentages 
according to: 100 ∗ (exp(βi) − 1), which means that a unit change equals that much 
percentage change in the respective crime rate (e.g. a licensed premises.  
Back to the results, overall crime can be seen influenced with the proximity of alcohol supply. 
Keskiolutlaki alone increases the crime significantly (estimated ~13.76 % increase). However, 
the only significant factor besides the legislative change contributing to crime is the presence 
of licensed premises in the municipal area before the legislative change. After the legislative 
change this effect is revoked with a larger negative coefficient (which is insignificant). In a 
way this makes sense, as the crime associated with licensed premises before the legislative 
change is substituted or diminished with the flood of places where one can buy medium-
strength beer. As for the roles of the distances to Alko, well they can be seen as 
understandable, although they are not statistically significant: the base elasticity is -0,039 % 
change in crime for every added percent in distance to Alko. The effect after the legislative 
change is more marginal, but goes in the same direction. However it is nowhere near of being 
significant. In addition to this, if we use the group setting in the regression, all the coefficients 
expressing alcohol supply become insignificant, which makes the findings rather inconsistent 
in terms of the first regression. This is however understandable: the traffic crime trends 
introduced in figure D.2 in appendix D show us that the trends go in different directions for 
the groups and thus it is likely that the traffic crimes mess this group setting up. 
To get over with the variables with a more supporting nature, speed limit dummies were used 
with the overall crimes and traffic crimes, and are mostly highly significant. Especially the 
later ones can be interpreted to majorly increase the consequent crime rates, while the first 
legislative changes actually seem to reduce crime. This might be due the fact that the 
legislation became increasingly strict along the years: Initially the introduction of speed limits 
actually reduced reckless driving and thus crime counts, but after a certain threshold citizens 
no longer deemed it that binding (some form of mass cognitive bias). Or it might be that the 
enforcement of the speed limits could have been less harsh during a transition period and after 
such a period there would be full control. However as fascinating this is, the traffic crimes 
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were not chosen for the diff-in-diff group setup (figure D.2 revisited), but an overall 
regression is presented for them shortly.  
Getting back to the supporting variables, population density has a negative effect on the 
overall crime and this effect is statistically significant in almost all of the regressions. For 
example one percent increase in population density decreases the overall crime rates from the 
geometric mean by ~-0.39 % (and the same kind of effect applies for all the regressions 
performed, only fatal offences and attempts at these had insignificant result). Suppose that this 
does not make sense that there is more crime per capita in low-density rural municipalities 
than in cities. At first I was a little baffled by this negative effect, however I have a proposed 
explanation to this: The information contained by the population density variable does not 
take into consideration whether the population is clustered (instead it presumes maximal 
dispersion), so in a sense the Alko store proximity (and other variables) probably catch the 
plausible effect of population density on crime better than the population densities generated 
by me do (see figure 11 on page 37). To put this into a more practical context: Take a 
municipality with a huge area. The population density variable subjects the population to this 
whole area, while the population might be clustered in a much smaller area, making this a 
rather inefficient predictor of the true density. As the Alko stores were gathered in clustered 
areas by definition, they probably capture these differences better than my estimations do. 
The linear time trend also shows high significance: The crime levels rise in a linear fashion it 
seems. The time trend is also significant for all the regressions.  
As for the traffic crimes mentioned earlier with the speed limit dummies: First impressions 
are that alcohol supply has a negative impact on traffic crimes (significance aside): 
 
Table 8. OLS results for traffic crime 
The distance to Alko stores seem to decrease traffic crimes pre-legislative change, and after 
the legislative change this effect is revoked (both of these are significant). This makes sense, 
as the role of the Alko stores probably diminishes with the flood of alcohol supply. The 
presence of licensed premises increases traffic crimes only after the legislative change (both 
Pre Post Pre Post
Distance (ln) -0.052 (*) 0.0482 (**) Distance (ln) -0.052 0.0482
License (1,0) 0.0247 (ns) -0.036 (ns.) License (1,0) 2.501 -3.536
Keskiolutlaki - -0.439 (ns.) Keskiolutlaki - -35.532
Traffic crime Traffic crime (%)
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of these coefficients are insignificant however), and the introduction of Keskiolutlaki actually 
seems to lower the traffic crime rates. This can be seen as rather inconsistent, and intuitively 
if alcohol supply has an effect on the overall traffic crime rates, it has a rather marginal effect. 
The experimental group setup was chosen to be excluded from here for the sake of similar 
reasoning: according to the group trends, alcohol supply was not seen to predict traffic crimes, 
rather the other way around.  My intuitive explanation to this is that the presence of alcohol 
supply correlates negatively rather well with the sizes of the municipal car fleets which 
correlate directly with the traffic crimes (see appendix D for a more thorough speculation of 
this).  
Also the regressions explaining the so called ‘other crimes’ are excluded from here. Alcohol 
supply seems to have highly insignificant trends regarding the ‘other crimes’ and is deemed 
unworthy of gaining space here. However, now we get into more interesting crime rates, or to 
be precise with drunk arrests, let us call them incidence rates:  
 
Table 9. OLS results for drunk arrests 
Drunk arrests can be seen highly significant in terms of the how they react to alcohol supply.  
The distance to Alko stores significantly decreases the amount of drunk arrests both pre- and 
post-legislative change (thus the presence of Alko stores increases them) and the presence of 
licensed premises also increases drunk arrests significantly after the legislative change. To be 
precise, especially the licensed premises have a huge impact after the legislative change. The 
spreading of the medium-strength beer supply network however, does not seem to correlate 
positively with drunk arrests (although the effect is insignificant, and thus not much can be 
said of it).  
The role of the licensed premises revisited from chapter 3.3: Pre-legislative change the 
licensed premises were mostly fancier restaurants, which was seen as an intended strategy to 
reduce alcohol consumption as stated by Lampela (1964). After the legislative change, the 
amount of more common bars exploded, which made the licensed premises more accessible to 
the common man. The logic behind this finding goes as follows: in fancier establishments 
Pre Post Pre Post
Distance (ln) -0.253 (***) -0.119 (***) Distance (ln) -0.253 -0.119
License (1,0) -0.079 (ns) 0.36 (***) License (1,0) -7.66 43.3
Keskiolutlaki (1,0) - -0.244 (ns) Keskiolutlaki (1,0) - -21.7
Drunk arrests (%)Drunk arrests
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there are more binding social and financial constraints on getting intoxicated than there are in 
more sleazy bars.  There is also another way to ponder this relation with drunk arrests and 
licensed premises: The licensed premises were rather stationary points, and it was probably 
easier for the police to pick intoxicated persons by just patrolling near them at certain time 
points or by a notification of the staff of the given premise. Thus by getting drunk in a 
licensed establishment one would expose herself to the public eye. Same does not apply for 
the liquor bought from a retail store, which could be consumed to the point of being drunk 
without necessarily causing public disorder. The difference between the licensed premises 
offering more broad alcohol supply (broad by ABV) and the premises offering only medium-
strength beer is rather self-explanatory and is provided by the following equation (not to be 
taken too seriously in medical terms): 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = (𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑) ∗ 
(𝐴𝐵𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑) ∗ (𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑙) 
The major difference being the limited ABV of the medium-strength beer.  Furthermore, if we 
analyze the quasi-experimental group setup, there are some differences. The analysis is quite 
tedious as one can see from below: 
 
Table 10. Group setup OLS results for drunk arrests 
These are directly converted as percentages in a similar fashion as in the right-hand side of the 
tables presented before. Control group II is used as the reference group (the municipalities 
which did not receive Alko stores by 1975). Thus the figures, in the upper row of tables speak 
for it (but these figures have to be taken into consideration with the other groups also).  
As we can see, there are similar findings when taking a look on the upper left-hand side table 
as with the regression without the group setup. The licensed premises seem to have a big 
Drunk arrests  (%)
Pre Post
Distance (ln) -0.040 (ns) -0.239 (**)
License (1,0) -12.71 (*) 57.46 (***)
Keskiolutlaki - 11.51 (ns)
Group specific effects
Distance (ln) License (1,0) Keskiolutlaki (1,0)
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Treat -0.162 (ns) -0.0078 (ns) Treat 3.35 (ns) -36.05 (***) Treat - -33.17 (ns)
Ctrl 1 -0.106 (ns) 0.257 (**) Ctrl 1 39.09 (ns) - Ctrl 1 - -47.43 (*)
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impact on the drunk arrests after the legislative change at least in the treatment and Control II 
municipalities. Nothing should be said of the cities (Control 1), as the figure pre-1969 is 
insignificant, yet its magnitude is quite large. Also the figure post-1969 is omitted for Control 
1 due to collinearity (cities that received Alko stores before the legislative change each had 
licensed premises in their area after the legislative change). The distance to the Alko stores 
also seems to decrease drunk arrests after the legislative change (except for the cities, which 
have a significant positive effect for the distance. However this is not as one-sided as it first 
seems to be: As the effect is positive for every percent more in the distance and as there exists 
an approximated distance to Alko for each city that housed one as well, the presence of Alko 
stores can be interpreted to increase drunk arrests in the cities as well!). Not much can be said 
of the medium-strength beer network as the values are mostly insignificant, except for that we 
cannot rule out that the medium-strength beer might have less explanatory power than the 
places offering more potent alcohol. One more factor to be considered with the licensed 
premises is that there might be a pooling effect: do the licensed premises gather folk from 
surrounding municipalities?  Do the premises gather persons from surrounding municipalities 
that are more likely to drink loads? The crime levels that are seen might express that they are 
more pooled than before, not necessarily that there exists more drunk arrests.  
Moving on to more rare counts of crime. Now the logarithmic transformation for the 
independent variables is lifted: The skewed distributions pose no threat to Poisson regression 
as the approach is not trying to fit a symmetrical, normal model to the data and thus account 
for the high counts with high variance estimates (Nussbaum;Elsadat;& Khago, 2008) .  
The Poisson regression results are presented mostly as incidence rate ratios introduced in 
chapter 5.3.2. If the interaction variables seem bring out something of interest, the incidence 
rate ratios are calculated by taking the underlying coefficients into consideration. An example 
is in order: There is an underlying continuous variable (distance to Alko), and we are 
interested in how a dummy interacts with it (Keskiolutlaki). Given the initial continuous 
variable coefficient, the coefficient of the interaction can be interpreted as to change to this 
coefficient, when the dummy variable is in effect). What is problematic, is that this effect and 
the significance levels associated with it, change with the levels of the continuous variable 
associated with the interaction variable (dummy-dummy –interactions are way simpler). 
However, I choose to limit the interpretation of the interaction coefficients as more general-
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level estimators on how a given dummy variable (legislative change or a group dummy) 
changes the effect of different types of alcohol supply.  
Take an arbitrary example of Poisson regression coefficients: 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝛽2𝐷 + 𝛽3(𝑥 ∗ 𝐷) 
where 𝛽1 = 0.1, 𝛽2 = 0.2 and 𝛽3 = −0,05. To calculate the effect of the dummy (D) on a 
continuous variable x, we need the coefficients to have form the incidence rate ratio: exp (𝛽1 ∗
𝑥 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑥). If the dummy gains the value 0, the marginal effect of x is exp(𝛽1) =
exp(0.1) = ~1.10, which equals 10% increase per one unit of x. If the dummy gains the 
value 1, the marginal effect of x is: exp(𝛽1 + 𝛽3) = exp(0,1 − 0.05) = ~1.05 which equals 
only a 5% increase per a unit of x. If we check how the difference goes with two units: 
exp(𝛽1) = exp(2 ∗ 0.1) = ~1,22 versus exp(𝛽1 + 𝛽3) = exp(2 ∗ 0,1 − 2 ∗ 0.05) =
~1.105, we can see that the gap widens (Maarten L. Buis, 2010). Instead of tabling and 
interpreting all the plausible outcomes and standard errors that are associated with different 
levels of the continuous variable, I am going to focus on the marginal effect. 
So instead of calculating different coefficients for different distances to Alko and putting them 
into a table (and thus the different significance levels), I have chosen to just interpret the 
results as changes given by one unit. The reasoning behind this goes as follows: the setting is 
too inaccurate to begin with and the end product would have little information value. Without 
further interruptions, the Poisson regression results for batteries: 
 
Table 11. Poisson results for batteries (IRR) 
Pre-legislative change, the distance to Alko store decreases crime by -0.0052% with one 
kilometer added and the effect is significant. After the legislative change this effect is 
insignificant. The effect of the licensed premises is insignificant on both sides of the 
legislative change. The introduction of medium-strength beer network highly increases the 
amount of batteries (~37.7%, highly significant). Alcohol supply seems to bring up the 
brawling side of the Finns. 
Pre Post
Distance (ln) 0.9948 (***) 0.9985 (ns)
License (1,0) 1.066 (ns) 1.1247 (ns)
Keskiolutlaki - 1.3768 (***)
Battery (IRR)
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Bringing the experimental group setup here yields some interesting results in terms of the 
Treatment and Control II groups: 
 
Table 12. Group setup Poisson results for batteries 
The above table contains the “raw figures” from the Poisson regression. The distance to Alko 
stores can be seen significant for at least the Control II group pre-1969. After the legislative 
change, not much can be said of its role as the figures are insignificant. More interestingly, 
now the licensed premises seem to be on a rather significant role in explaining crime in the 
Treatment-group municipalities: pre-legislative change they increased crime and post-1969 
the effect is somewhat revoked, with the medium-strength beer taking its role. 
Indeed, as for the medium-strength beer network, it seemed to have a most prominent effect 
on the municipal batteries, with significant levels for both Treatment and Control II groups 
Turned as incidence rate ratios, treatment: exp(0.2011 + 0.4125) = 1.847, which means a 
considerable  ~84.7 % increase in batteries after the legislative change and for Control II: 
exp(0.2011) = 1.2227, a consequent ~22.3% increase in the batteries (these are dummy-
dummy interactions, if we would calculate the incidence rate ratios for the distance to Alko X 
dummy interactions,  say for treatment group pre-1969, it would go as follows: exp(−0.049 ∗
1 − 0.011 ∗ 1) = 0.9417 = ~5.82 % in batteries for one unit change in distance, but as the 
interaction term is not significant, this is more likely a curiosity).  It is also most likely that 
the batteries were increased in the Control 1 group, as even though the interaction term is 
insignificant, its magnitude is smaller than the overall effect and it goes in the same direction 
(0.0211 > 0.1114, both positive), which would imply that there was an increase. Intuitively, 
this would mean that the batteries were more affected by the overall availability of alcohol, 
not the presence of certain more specific forms of alcohol supply. Additionally, as opposed to 
the drunk arrests, batteries, (which are a real crime), have a lot smaller chance of staying 
Pre Post
Distance (ln) -0.049 (**) 0.0027 (ns)
License (1,0) 0.2496 (ns) 0.1246 (ns)
Keskiolutlaki - 0.2011 (*)
Group setting
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Treat -.0011 (ns) -0.056 (ns) Treat 0.2756 (*) -0.4515 (**) Treat - 0.4125 (**)
Ctrl 1 0.024 (ns) 0.0049 (ns) Ctrl 1 01755 (ns) - Ctrl 1 - 0.1114 (ns)
Battery
Distance (ln) License (1,0) Keskiolutlaki (1,0)
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undetected as they are mostly non-complainant offences. Moving on: After batteries, the next 
logical step in terms of the severity of crime are fatal offences and attempts at these.  
 
Table 13. Poisson results for fatal offences and attempts at these 
Fatal offences and attempts at these were deemed unfit for the group setup, thus we only focus 
on the overall effects of alcohol supply. The effect of the distance to Alko seems to be 
insignificant and quite small, but after that there are some more interesting findings. Before 
the legislative change, there actually seemed to happen less fatal offences and attempts at 
these in municipalities where there were licenses premises (100 ∗ (exp(−0.3417) − 1) =
~ − 29%). Post-1969, this effect is reversed, and there is more crime in the municipalities 
which had licensed premises in their area (100 ∗ (exp(−0.3417 + 0.5985) − 1) = ~29%). 
The medium-strength beer network however does not seem to increase fatal offences (100 ∗
(exp(−0,5714) − 1) = ~ − 55,47 %). The most prominent predictor of fatal offences and 
attempts at these seems to be the presence of licensed premises after the legislative change, 
although, it must be stated that the Keskiolutlaki-dummy nearly eliminates this relation and 
thus it is best not to say anything definitive of the subtle relation between bottle and knife. 
Instead, I will continue to speculate: as is stated in appendix D, if one wishes to kill someone, 
it does not look at the time and place, people with a tendency of getting hyper-violent while 
under the influence are distributed randomly across the population and they probably have 
their own means of getting alcohol. Also it must be noted that the counts of murder (& 
attempts) probably are not as influenced by alcohol as opposed to manslaughter (& attempts). 
If we take the noun “a plan”, which can be alternatively expressed as “an intention or decision 
about what one is going to do” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). Intuitively crime under the 
influence of alcohol is not that much planned, rather “spur-of-the-moment” describes it 
better12.  
                                                 
12 Even though according to the contemporary legislation, a manslaughter is treated as a murder if it is e.g. done 
in a remarkably cruel or brutal manner (Rikoslaki 21.4.1995/ 578, 21:2). 
Pre Post
Distance (ln) -0.0007 (ns) 0.0046 (ns)
License (1,0) -0.3417(**) 0.5985 (**)
Keskiolutlaki - -0.5714 (**)
Murder etc. 
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6.2 Proposals for further studies 
The whole Keskiolutlaki serves as a huge social experiment on what alcohol availability 
causes on the societal level and thus is an interesting subject to study.  In the scope of this 
thesis, I have identified three main sources on which to improve.  
The accuracy of data: 
Aggregated crime levels do not work that well, especially with crimes that are pooled with a 
broad scope. Regarding certain aggregated crime types, the legislative change might even 
have a mixed effect on different crime types under the same label: Certain crime counts might 
rise and others might fall, thus dampening the overall effect (e.g. the crime counts involving 
illegal distilling probably went down). The basis of the problem is that certain crime types 
react differently to alcohol supply, and while the effect might go in the same direction, it 
would make more sense to study the relation of specific crime counts instead of aggregated 
counts. This would also make the analysis more transparent. Thus my recommendation is to 
focus on the more specific crime counts rather than on aggregated figures such as ‘traffic 
crimes’.  
Another factor to consider with the accuracy of data, is the accuracy of the alcohol supply. 
There are some rather general-level approximations (dummies), and while the estimated 
distances to Alko stores might help with catching spill-over effects, they are still quite crude. 
My solution to this is to take population densities and real coordinates of the Alko stores and 
conduct spatial analysis with them. The population center of each municipality and the actual 
coordinates where the Alko store stood would probably yield more consistent results. Of 
course it is a whole different story, on where one would find such population maps or 
statistics from the turn of 70s. 
Finally, also a longer time period after the legislative change, in order to detect whether 
alcohol supply has a lagging effect on crime. To conclude with the accuracy of the data: I feel 
like the statistical significance is a bit drowned in the rather general-level estimations on 
alcohol supply and in the aggregated figures regarding crime. This is made worse with the 
pooled crime counts in the municipalities that had to be adjusted according to the hundreds in 
the initial data.  
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The omitted variables: 
How controlled is the setup? Well, it boils down to the municipal time-variant effects as the 
fixed effects presumably catches the time-invariant municipal level of crime. As stated in the 
‘previous studies’ -chapter, socioeconomic and –demographic factors are likely to have a 
huge impact on crime and can even act as envoys for alcohol related crime. Minority-wise 
Finland can be seen as a rather stable place, but what I have failed to control are the municipal 
levels of young males (that can be seen criminally as rather active by a multitude of studies). 
Age and gender figures would have come handy, as would have more socioeconomic 
statistics such as unemployment figures and median pay, as these kinds of factors had quite a 
lot of explanatory power in terms of the studies conducted in the U.S. Additionally some 
factor controlling for the homemade alcohol would also come handy, even though it might be 
rather constant municipality-wise. I would have greeted statistics of police resources and of 
municipal car fleet sizes gleefully. So the recipe is: More time-invariant variables and more 
precisely expressed variables. 
The experimental Design:   
Personally, I think that my biggest challenge was to create a more efficient experimental 
setup. Initially the setup in use seemed like a great idea, but when it came to deciphering the 
results, is became plain tedious. Retrospectively, a simpler and yet more elegant group setting 
would have probably been less tedious, but I did not manage to develop such a group design 
(e.g. identifying two highly similar groups of municipalities with the only difference some 
form of alcohol supply). Although it is not certain that such a group design is easy to attain, as 
there are a lot of spillover effects and more likely the data just needs more control variables. 
The fact that the alcohol supply manifested itself at different time points in different 
municipalities instead of an exact treatment time point additionally complicated this setting. 
There is also a fact considering the fixed effects approach. A lot of the alcohol supply stays 
fixed in the municipalities during the time period. This supply is omitted in the fixed effects 
regressions as it is constant and thus part of the fixed municipal effect. This leads to loss of 
statistical power and could be also combated with more variables and more accurate data. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Alcohol supply can be seen to have affected the following crime rates:  
Batteries, overall crime, and drunk and disorderly conduct.  
 
The magnitude and significance of the effects varies according to the crime 
types and the types of alcohol supply. Some evidence is presented that the 
municipal differences also mattered in how the alcohol supply mediated 
related crime: The evidence is minor and most likely reflects the need for 
more time-variant control variables.  
 
There is also some evidence that the types (not only the volume) of alcohol 
supply (Alko stores, licensed premises, places offering only medium-strength 
beer) have varying effects on different types of observed crime. I speculate 
that different types of alcohol supply might correlate differently with the 
observability of the crime. 
 
As this legislative change is a unique setting in terms of how alcohol supply 
affected crime rates and social conditions, I suggest the following ways to 
improve this study: more accurate data and especially more time-variant 
variables to distinguish between what sort of socioeconomic and -
demographic conditions favor crime. More efficient experimental setup is 
also proposed. 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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9 Appendices 
Appendix A: Georeferencing the municipal maps 
The picture below is given to give a more clear view on the georeferencing process of the 
municipality maps of Finland from 1960 (Maanmittaushallitus, 1960) and 2015 (National 
Land Survey, Esri Finland , 2015). The white lines in the zoomed map represent the 
municipal division of 1960 while the black lines represent the municipal division of 2015. 
The maps were combined with the ArcMap component of the ArcGIS software (by 
Environmental systems Research Institute, version 10.2.2). Common points were pinpointed 
on the maps and the maps were fitted together using third order polynomials according to 
these points as the map from 1960 was quite distorted. After initial suffering, the end result 
was quite pleasing.  
These maps are further used in modelling the municipalities and municipal clusters into a 
digitalized form, so that estimations for Alko store distances can be made. The municipal 
division map of 2015 is used as the base map for the coordinates.  
 
Image A.1. A zoom of the georeferencing process from ArcMap 10.3.1  
 (National Land Survey, Esri Finland , 2015) (Maanmittaushallitus, 1960) 
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Appendix B: Estimating the distances  
 
Image B.1. Screenshots of different stages of distance estimation from ArcMap 10.3.1  
  
After the georeferencing process (previous appendix, also bottom two screenshots) was 
complete, the municipal lines had to be drawn according to the municipal division instated by 
myself earlier on. These newly drawn county shapes, that appear with pink background and 
teal borders, are known as polygons in geometry.  
The municipal areas and distances are estimated with the help of these polygons. While the 
areas were quite easily determined, the distances needed additional attention. The distances 
are annually estimated from each municipality polygon’s centroid (red dots on the two top left 
screenshots) to its nearest municipality polygon’s centroid with an Alko store (green triangles 
on the top left screenshot).  
There are two things that have to be considered with this approach: 
I) In general the distances estimated are quite crude as they are Euclidean distances 
and ignore all sorts of population distributions.  
II) If the given municipality has an Alko store it must be noted that the estimated 
distance is zero. 
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The first issue is something that I just have to live with13. The second issue however is 
combated with a work-around in form of circle radius:  The municipal area estimated is taken 
as a circle, and the radius of the circle is calculated with simple geometry. This radius is then 
used to substitute the zero-estimate of the Alko distance after a subtle transformation: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑙𝑘𝑜 = 0,5 ∗
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠
𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑘𝑜 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
There are also two reasons for this: The zero distance does not reflect the true distance in any 
way and, after considerable efforts, I did not figure out how to estimate the average distance 
from an irregular polygon’s centroid to its border. 
There are of course problems with the radius-based approach: It ignores the original shape of 
the municipality and forces the shape of a circle, which can lead into problems regarding the 
municipality’s shape: The further it truly is from a circle, the poorer the estimated distance. 
However as the Alko stores were built near populations, and the populations tend to cluster, I 
believe that this circle radius approach is not that big of a sin and I believe that it is truer 
expression of the distance than zero-distance could ever be. Further efforts are also considered 
in tackling the population vs. geographical centroid issues: As the true distance to the Alko 
store lies probably nearer zero than the generated radius does, an additional arbitrary factor, 
which gets smaller with each Alko store in the municipal area, is used in reducing the radius-
distances of these municipalities that housed Alko stores.  
 
 
  
  
                                                 
13 I actually live with it quite well: we can presume that the population centroids can be expressed as the 
geographical centroids of the municipalities. Individual municipality-wise this could not be further away from 
truth, but after considering the sheer amount of municipalities, I’m sure that the individual differences will 
balance out. That is unless there are some major endogeneities related to the choices of municipal population 
centers (e.g. the coastline might be one).  
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics for the diff-in-diff groups 
 
Table C.1. Descriptive statistics for the Diff-in-diff groups  
Alko pre-1969 (n=73)
Population dens. Mean St.dev. Max Min Median Kurtosis Skewness
1960 202.24 379.01 2868.50 3.51 67.45 34.41 5.21
1975 277.69 476.27 3182.49 3.29 72.98 19.49 3.83
Dist. to Alko
1960 9.17 15.08 98.43 0.14 4.49 17.81 3.80
1975 4.99 4.04 17.98 0.11 3.79 1.16 1.16
Licens. dumm.
1960 0.90 0.30 1.00 0.00 1.00 6.02 -2.80
1975 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 -
Alko post-1969 (n=57)
Population dens. Mean St.dev. Max Min Median Kurtosis Skewness
1960 15.22 22.90 171.34 0.33 9.73 39.91 5.89
1975 19.86 63.91 486.94 0.36 8.06 53.55 7.22
Dist. to Alko
1960 50.80 41.32 269.20 6.39 42.38 13.73 3.17
1975 11.73 6.89 42.48 2.14 10.16 6.98 2.30
Licens. dumm.
1960 0.16 0.37 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.78 1.93
1975 0.98 0.13 1.00 0.00 1.00 57.00 -7.55
No Alko (n=139)
Population dens. Mean St.dev. Max Min Median Kurtosis Skewness
1960 13.74 9.36 81.42 0.52 11.97 19.79 3.30
1975 12.66 13.43 129.08 0.45 9.01 41.39 5.35
Dist. to Alko
1960 32.98 27.93 249.42 1.97 26.14 26.58 4.10
1975 25.96 14.44 112.57 1.97 24.02 9.67 2.21
Licens. dumm.
1960 0.04 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.00 18.93 4.54
1975 0.85 0.36 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.91 -1.97
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Appendix D: Graphs for the diff-in-diff approach 
This appendix focuses on the judging whether there are notable trend changes among the 
quasi-experimental groups after the Keskiolutlaki’s entry into force and if Differences-in-
differences based approach is a valid choice.   
A quick recap on the group composition before we start with the overall crimes:  
Treatment group: Alko post-69 
Control group I: Alko pre-69 
Control group II: No Alko 
All the crime levels are annual averages for the above group averages and are announced as 
crimes per 1000 persons, unless stated otherwise.  
 
Figure D.1. Group trends: Overall crime per population  
For overall crimes, there is a very minor convergence between the treatment group and the 
control group 1 after the legislative change and before that, the group trends seem to follow 
each other even better than I had anticipated. There is also evidence of fixed group level 
differences.  
In the next two figures (G.2 and G.3), an interesting, yet galling phenomenon regarding the 
statistical bookkeeping can be sighted at the turn of 1964 and 1965.  At 1965 something has 
changed regarding the statistical bookkeeping that concerns traffic crimes and honestly I do 
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not have a clue what it is. However this is overridden by just limiting the observations for 
traffic crimes and other crimes to the years 1965-1975.  
 
Figure D.2. Group trends: Traffic crime per population  
First thing that is noticeable is that the base traffic crime rate in the treatment municipalities is 
a lot higher than in the other groups and the trends follow each other quite well until the 70s 
hits them with the varying attempts at speed limit legislation. There is very little change 
immediately after 1969. Most interesting convergence in the crime rates happens with the 
municipalities that had no Alko during the period as in the 70s they start to catch the 
municipalities that received Alko stores post-1969. To speculate these differences, I represent 
plausible reasons for this considering appendix C, which contains descriptive statistics for 
these groups. 
There was little need for cars in the bigger municipalities (Alko-pre 69 group), as public 
transportation was pretty well established and thus the population adjusted car numbers most 
likely were smaller in the cities. 
As for the treatment group and control group II, which had smaller population densities, there 
probably was more need for a car. What is peculiar, is that their initial levels of traffic crime 
are on the different ends of the scale. To speculate reasons behind this, I am relying on the 
word of contemporary people: Even in the 60s, the “really rural” municipalities were quite 
poor and very few families owned automobiles before the 70s. In these municipalities horses 
were a more likely source of transportation than two-stroke engines (Luukkonen, 2015).  
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So basically I am presuming that people in the treatment group had it better than the people in 
the control group II (the Alko stores could work as a proxy of this). Presumably if there were 
more cars in the treatment group, the surveillance of the traffic police would have been 
concentrated there. Thus the base traffic crime –level in the ‘No Alko’ -municipalities might 
have started to rise because of increasing car pool and/or the increased law enforcement by 
the traffic police.  
In order to better estimate the reasons behind these crime levels or trend changes, some 
additional statistics especially regarding municipal car fleets would come handy. However 
fascinating, we are not interested in the trend changes of traffic crimes if they are most likely 
related with the changes in speed limit legislation, and not alcohol availability.  Thus diff-in-
diff –approach is not encouraged with traffic crimes. 
 
Figure D.3. Group trends: Other crime per population  
As for the population adjusted other crimes, which were formed by deducing all the other 
crime types from overall crimes, the trends seem to follow each other quite slavishly. The 
treatment group’s trend seems to diverge from the other rural municipalities after 1969, and as 
such diff-in-diff regression is chosen as the primary tool to analyze other crimes. 
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Figure D.4. Group trends: Drunk arrests per population  
The figure containing population adjusted drunk arrests is the most beautiful in terms of the 
trend change. This captures the essence of the diff-in-diff setup: The trends were on a steady 
level before the legislative change and the treatment group takes a clear turn after 1969 (as 
does control I, but this was expected). 
 
Figure D.5. Group trends: Batteries per population  
For population adjusted batteries, there also seems to enough preliminary evidence for the 
diff-in-diff approach, even though the trend of the treatment municipalities seems to break off 
from the other rural municipalities before the legislative change.  
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Figure D.6. Group trends: Fatal offences at attempts at these per population  
While it might be a bit controversial to adjust small crime counts of zero with population, as 
small counts such as 1 attempt to kill another person might inflate the figures in population-
wise small municipalities, I deem it necessary in order to see the trends (and it is not that big 
of a sin as the numbers are averages).  
First impression: The population adjusted “murder counts” seem to follow a random walk 
process more than having clear trends and thus there is little evidence for diff-in-diff-approach 
here. Thus the group setup is neglected in the regression explaining the fatal offences.  
Speculation about the lack of trend changes (or trends in general) is presented below. 
If one deems it necessary to kill someone, it does not look at the time and place. People with a 
tendency to commit killings seem to be “distributed” randomly across the population and this 
attempt to divide municipalities is not enough to identify plausible differences.  
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Appendix E: Robust standard errors in fighting heteroscedasticity 
Instead of trying to prove that the variables are homoscedastic14, I am going to apply robust 
standard errors, as it is highly likely that a time series data set this large would have 
heteroscedasticity present. In general it does not matter whether or not there is 
heteroscedasticity detected, now we just do apply the robust standard errors in an effort to be 
“conservative”.   
The problems related to heteroscedasticity can be defined with a simple linear regression 
(Wooldridge, 2013): 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖     (1) 
We assume that the first four Gauss-Markov assumptions hold. If the errors contain 
heteroscedasticity, the 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖|𝑥𝑖) =  𝜎𝑖
2 , where the subscript 𝑖 on 𝜎𝑖
2 indicates that the 
variance of the error depends upon the particular value of 𝑥𝑖. The fitted OLS estimator can be 
written as: 
?̂?1 =
∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑥
𝑛
𝑖=1 )(𝑦𝑖−𝑦)
∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑥
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
2      (2) 
Without the homoscedasticity assumption and conditioning the values 𝑥𝑖  in the sample, we 
can show that 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖) =
∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑥
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝜎𝑖
2
∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑥
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
2       (3) 
When 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜎2 for all 𝑖, the formula is reduced to the usual form 
𝜎2
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑥
 , where 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑥 =
 ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
2. Thus equation (3) shows that the variance formula is no longer valid when 
heteroscedasticity is present. As the standard error of ?̂?1 is directly based on estimating its 
                                                 
14 The variance of a variable is unequal across the range of values of a second variable that predicts it. This can 
have implications with standard errors and test-statistics being biased. (Taylor, 2013) 
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variance, a way to estimate equation (3) is needed. This can be taken care with the OLS 
residuals ?̂?𝑖 from the initial regression of y on x, making (4) a valid estimator of 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖): 
∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑥
𝑛
𝑖=1 )𝑢𝑖
2
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑥
      (4) 
If equation (4) multiplied by the sample size n, it converges in probability to 
𝐸[(𝑥𝑖−𝑢𝑥)
2𝑢𝑖
2]
(𝜎𝑥
2)
2 , 
which is the probability limit of n times (3).  Thus the square root of (4) is called the 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard error for ?̂?𝑖. This can be applied to multiple regression 
model as well. 
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Appendix F: Skewed distributions and logarithmic transformation 
As the crime distributions are quite skewed, some adjustment can be seen as appropriate. In 
order to fight skewed distributions and more extreme values logarithmic transformation on 
certain variables is considered.  
When the dependent variable is larger than zero, models using log(y) as the dependent 
variable often satisfy the assumptions related to linear regression better than the level of y 
would. Strictly positive values also often have distributions that are both skewed and 
heteroskedastic and taking the log can mitigate both problems. Taking logarithmic values also 
often narrows the range of values, which makes the analysis less sensitive to outliers. 
However logarithmic transformation is something not to be taken lightly as it can lead to 
more extreme values with variables of which values are between zero and one and it is nigh 
useless if the variable takes on zero or negative values. (Wooldridge, 2013) 
Considering the tables containing the descriptive statistics presented in chapter 5, logarithmic 
transformation is applied with the following crimes: Overall crime, traffic crime, drunk arrests 
and other crimes. Logarithmic transformation is also applied with the distances to Alko and 
population densities. For the few zero valued observations in these, Stata simply treats as 
missing values and for the observations that take values between zero and one, they are also 
few in numbers and are just considered as a necessary evil. Ultimately I believe that these 
steps are necessary in order to transform the data more “regressible”. As for the other crime 
types, The Poisson regression takes care of batteries and ‘fatal offences and attempts at these’ 
as they contain too many zero valued observations that cannot be conveyed as logs.  
An example on how logarithmic transformation affects the descriptive statistics with 
population adjusted overall crimes: 
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Table F.1. The effect of logarithmic transformation on overall crime/population 
As we can see, the distribution after the logarithmic transformation is not normal, but it is way 
closer to one than distributions without the logarithmic transformation.  
As for the regressions, the coefficients of the transformed variables can be interpreted as 
follows (Wooldridge, 2013) (Benoit, 2011):  
log(𝑦) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log(𝑥1) + 𝛽2𝑥2 
For the explanatory variables that underwent logarithmic transformation, the interpretation is 
simple: Expected percentage change in y when x increases by some percentage. One percent 
change in 𝑥1 can be interpreted as 𝛽1 % change in y holding 𝑥2 fixed.  Hence this is an 
elasticity.  
For the variables that did not undergo transformation, the interpretation requires a bit algebra:  
 %∆𝑦 = 100 ∗ [exp(𝛽2∆𝑥2) − 1],  
This implies that one unit change in 𝑥2 can be interpreted as 100 ∗ [exp(𝛽2) − 1]% change in 
y.  To account for more than one unit increase in 𝑥2 , we must include c in the component. 
Each one unit increase in 𝑥2 multiplies the expected value of y by 𝑒
𝑐?̂? 
We can also directly take 𝛽2 as an approximation of the percentage change if the values of the 
coefficients are small (𝑒?̂? ≈ 1 + ?̂?), which means that 100 ∗ (?̂? − 1) is the approximated 
expected percentage change in y for one unit increase in x.  
  
Crime/pop Mean Kurtosis Skewness
1960 34.88 2.85 1.52
1975 97.15 7.18 1.92
Ln(crime/pop)
1960 3.43 -0.28 0.23
1975 4.49 0.45 0.04
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Appendix G: Inconsistent standard errors caused by correlation 
The correlation between observations is a problem that messes up the standard errors and thus 
trustworthy interpretation of the regression results.  
Three factors make correlation between observations highly important especially for 
differences-in-differences based estimation: I) DID usually relies on fairly long time series, II) 
most commonly used dependent variables in DID estimation are typically highly positively 
correlated and III) the treatment variable usually changes itself very little within a unit of 
observation over time.  These three factors can reinforce themselves in a fashion, such that the 
estimated standard errors could seriously understate the actual standard deviations. 
(Bertrand;Duflo;& Mullainathan, 2004) 
In essence, the problem related to correlation can be seen summed by ‘how much information 
the model presumes it has’ versus ‘how much information the model truly has due to the non-
independent observations’. If correlation between observations is neglected, this leads to 
interpreting all the observations as independent sources of information, while truly there are 
less independent observations than the model assumes. (Miles, 2014) 
To further distinguish between different types of correlation, the correlation between 
observations applies for both correlation in time (autocorrelation, the outcome of 
observation 𝑦𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 is correlated with 𝑦𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 ) or intra-cluster correlation (the outcome 𝑦1,1,𝑡 is 
correlated with the outcome of 𝑦1,2,𝑡  but not 𝑦2,1,𝑡 . The subscripts denominate 𝑖 for 
individual, 𝑐 for cluster and 𝑡 for point of time). The intra-cluster correlation can be seen as a 
presence of an observed shock that affects all the observations in one group while not the 
others, while serial correlation is regarded when the errors of observations of certain units are 
somehow temporally correlated with each other. Serial correlation in the errors may be due to 
measurement errors, misspecifications in the model, or due to omitted variables.  
The fixed effects takes care of the common random effects that are time-invariant on a 
municipal level. That being said, should time-variant random shocks affect some 
municipalities, it is highly unlikely that I will manage to identify and cluster these 
municipalities in a fashion that takes care of such shocks. Based on the historical literature 
evidence I have absorbed and the word of contemporary people, it is also highly unlikely that 
I have missed such a shock that affected crime in certain municipalities. The quasi-
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experimental group setup introduced in chapter 5.4.1 could be a plausible source for intra-
cluster correlation, although I seriously doubt that there is a mechanism for this: The clusters 
are geographically quite divided and I cannot imagine how some random unobserved shock 
would affect only one cluster and not the others (¡Alko stores are not unobserved!).  If the 
observations would consist of individual human beings committing crimes or not committing 
them, instead of municipalities (which in a sense are aggregated individuals), I would be more 
concerned as the individuals living in the same municipality could somehow be correlated 
intra-class-wise. My conclusion with the intra-class correlation is as follows: Finland in the 
turn of 70s was a quite homogenous place and with this, my identifying assumption is that the 
observed crime rates in different municipalities are independent observations (or independent 
enough) from each other. Thus the plausibility of unobserved shocks is dismissed in the scope 
of this study. 
Instead a more severe issue is serial correlation within the municipal level observations: Are 
the errors in municipal variables in different municipalities correlated in time? Temporal 
independence within municipalities is something that is hard to swallow with sixteen years of 
observations. Unfortunately there is a cure for this: Clustered standard errors as a way to fight 
serial correlation. Without going that much into the specifics, the clustered standard errors 
adjust the number of observations according to detected correlation within the unit that 
contains the observations (Miles, 2014). This works for temporally correlated observations as 
well: Stata does this clustering with ‘vce(robust)’-command if the municipal id has been 
specified as the identifying variable in the time series. This clusters the individual 
observations and thus this vce-estimator is robust individual-wise instead of observation-wise 
and is consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Drukker, 2009). 
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Appendix H: Interpreting the regression coefficients 
In order to give a clear interpretation of how the findings are analyzed, I will present an 
overview on how the coefficients of the regression should be interpreted pre- and post- 1969.  
Basically the dummy variables indicating different groups of the quasi-experiment are 
interacted with different variables indicating alcohol supply. The following variables are 
needed for each group, while this example focuses on the treatment group: 
Explained variable: 
Crime level in municipality X 
Explanatory variables that measure the effect of alcohol supply pre-legislative change: 
Treatment (omitted due to fixed effects model)  
𝛽3 ∗Distance to Alko 
𝛽4 ∗License dummy 
𝛽5 ∗(Treatment group*Distance to Alko) 
𝛽6 ∗(Treatment group*License dummy) 
The variables expressing alcohol supply are used in the overall regressions in measuring how 
the alcohol supply affects crime. If there are differences on how the quasi-experimental 
groups reacted on the alcohol supply, the interaction terms should capture these differences 
(𝛽5 and 𝛽6respectively). But wait, there is more: 
Explanatory variables that measure the effect of alcohol supply post- legislative change: 
The variables above, and:  
𝛽7 ∗Keskiolutlaki 
𝛽8 ∗(Distance to Alko *Keskiolutlaki) 
𝛽9 ∗(License dummy*Keskiolutlaki) 
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𝛽10 ∗(Treatment group*Keskiolutlaki) 
𝛽11 ∗(Treatment group*Distance to Alko post Keskiolutlaki) 
𝛽12 ∗(Treatment group*License dummy post Keskiolutlaki) 
After the legislative change, a dummy variable expressing the Keskiolutlaki’s entry into force 
is thrown in the fray. This dummy variable by its own expresses the effect of the medium-
strength beer joints (𝛽7) on crime. This dummy is also used to create interaction variables 
with the other forms of alcohol supply that had existed before the legislative change 
(𝛽8 and 𝛽9). These interaction variables are used in order to measure how the presumed roles 
of different alcohol supply (Alko stores and licensed premises) changed after the legislative 
change. The Keskiolutlaki dummy is also used with the quasi-experimental groups in order to 
check whether their response to medium-strength beer was different.  
To ma, quasi-experimental group interaction variables are also used in determining whether 
the groups reacted differently to the Alko stores and licensed premises after the legislative 
change (𝛽11 and 𝛽12). To put it other words; if the groups indeed reacted differently to alcohol 
supply pre-1969, then this effect most likely would have changed with the availability of 
medium-strength beer post-1969. Thus the coefficients are interacted with the Keskiolutlaki 
dummy after the legislative change. Yes, this might sound confusing. 
In order to interpret these results, all the coefficients should be added together. For example in 
order to determine how the alcohol supply affected a treatment municipality after the 
legislative change that had no licensed premises (dummy value zero) and a seven kilometer 
distance to Alko, we take: 
𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝟕 +  𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝟎 + 𝜷𝟓(𝟏 ∗ 𝟕) +  𝜷𝟔(𝟏 ∗ 𝟎) + 𝛽7 ∗ 1 +  𝛽8(7 ∗ 1)+𝛽9(0 ∗ 1) + 𝛽10(1 ∗ 1) +
𝛽11(1 ∗ 1 ∗ 7) + 𝛽12(1 ∗ 0 ∗ 1) 
The bolded part of the equation represents the effect of alcohol supply before the legislative 
change. In a nutshell, this kind of an equation should be able to distinguish the magnitude and 
the significance of the following things: 
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Pre-1969 
I) The effect of Alko stores and licensed premises on municipal crime. 
II) The differences of the quasi-experimental groups’ reaction to alcohol supply. 
 
Post-1969 
I) The effect of medium-strength beer on alcohol induced crime (the dummy itself) 
and the effect of Keskiolutlaki on the crime induced by the Alko stores and 
licensed premises (interaction variables with the variables indicating these). 
II) The differences of the quasi-experimental groups’ reaction to medium-strength 
beer and the change in the quasi-experimental groups’ reaction to alcohol supply 
that existed pre-legislative change. 
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Appendix i: Regression results 
OVERALL CRIME 
 
Table i.1. Overall crime without the group setup 
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Table i.2. Overall crime with the group setup 
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DRUNK ARRESTS 
 
Table i.3. Drunk arrests without the group setup 
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Table i.4. Drunk arrests with the group setup 
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OTHER CRIME 
 
Table i.5. Other crime without the group setup 
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Table i.6. Other crime with the group setup 
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TRAFFIC CRIME 
 
Table i.7. Traffic crime without the group setup 
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Table i.8. Traffic crime with the group setup 
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BATTERIES 
 
Table i.9. Batteries without the group setup 
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Table i.10. Batteries without the group setup (IRR) 
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Table i.11. Batteries with the group setup 
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Table i.12. Batteries with the group setup (IRR) 
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FATAL OFFENCES AND ATTEMPTS AT THESE 
 
 
Table i.13. Fatal offences (& attempts) without the group setup 
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Table i.14. Fatal offences (& attempts) without the group setup (IRR) 
 
  
 
 104 
 
Table i.15. Fatal offences (& attempts) with the group setup 
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Table i.16. Fatal offences (& attempts) with the group setup (IRR) 
 
 
